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Recent crisis in the global financial world has generated renewed interests in fragilities of global
financial networks among economists and regulatory authorities. In particular, a potential vulnera-
bility of the financial networks is the “financial contagion” process in which insolvencies of individ-
ual entities propagate through the “web of dependencies” to affect the entire system. In this paper,
we formalize an extension of a financial network model originally proposed by Nier et al. for sce-
narios such as the over-the-counter derivatives market, define a suitable global stability measure for
this model, and perform a comprehensive evaluation of this stability measure over more than 700,000
combinations of networks types and parameter combinations. Based on our evaluations, we discover
many interesting implications of our evaluations of this stability measure, and derive topological prop-
erties and parameter combinations that may be used to flag the network as a possible fragile net-
work. An interactive software FIN-STAB for computing the stability is available from the website
www2.cs.uic.edu/
˜
dasgupta/financial-simulator-files..
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1. Introduction
Recent unprecedented level of global financial crisis has clearly exposed potential weaknesses of the
global economic system, renewing interests in the determination of fragilities of various segments of
the global economy. Since financial institutions governed by borrowing, lending and participation in
risky investments played a crucial role in this crisis, they have attracted a major part of the attention
of economists; see [35] for a survey. The issue of instability of free market based financial systems is
not new and has been under discussion among the economists starting with the early works of [30, 42]
during the 1930’s great depression era. However, the exact causes of such instabilities have not been
unanimously agreed upon yet. Economists such as Ekelund and Thornton [27] contend that a major
reason for the recent financial crisis is the enactment of an act that removed several restrictions on
mixing investment and consumer banking, whereas other economists such as Calabria disagree with
such an assertion [14]. Some economists such as Minsky have argued that such instabilities are are
systemic for many modern market-based economic systems [52].
One motivation in this paper to investigate global stabilities of financial networks comes from the
point of view of a regulatory agency (as was also the case, for example, in [35]). A regulatory agency
with sufficient knowledge about a part of a global financial network is expected to periodically evaluate
the stability of the network, and flag the network ex ante for further analysis if it fails some preliminary
c© The author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications. All rights reserved.
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test or exceeds some minimum threshold of vulnerability. In this motivation, flagging a network as
vulnerable does not necessarily imply that such is the case, but that such a network requires further
analysis based on other aspects of free market economics that are not or simply cannot be modeled1.
While too many false positives may drain the finite resources of a regulatory agency for further analysis
and investigation, this motivation assumes that vulnerability is too important an issue to be left for an ex
post analysis.
Similar to prior research works such as [9, 25, 35, 55, 33, 49], our study of the vulnerability of
financial networks also assumes the absence of government intervention as banks become insolvent.
While this is an extreme worst-case situation, the main goal of such type of studies is to see if the network
can survive a shock even under extreme situations. A further reason for not allowing any intervention is,
unlike the case of public health issues such as controlling spread of epidemics, government intervention
in a capitalist financial system is often not allowed or requires complex political and administrative
operatives.
2. Brief review of related prior works on financial networks
Although there is a large amount of literature on stability of financial systems (e.g., see [25, 9, 16, 6, 1,
26, 43, 51, 45, 3, 24, 33, 31, 34, 47, 23, 46, 38, 55, 22, 7]), very few prior papers have mathematically
defined a global stability measure and performed a comprehensive evaluation of such a measure as done
in this paper. A most recent research work related to our work is the paper by Minoiu and Reyes [51]
in which the authors analyzed global banking networks data on cross-border banking flows for 184
countries during 1978-2010 using local connectivity and clustering measures. Below we review other
related prior research works. Although ordinarily one would expect the risk of contagion to be larger in
a highly interconnected banking system, prior simulation works indicate that higher connectivity among
banks may sometimes lead to lower risk of contagion. Due to the large volume of prior research works,
we are only able to review a selected subset of related prior research works, leaving many other exciting
research results in the bibliographies of the cited papers.
Allen and Gale [3] found that when consumers have the liquidity preferences as introduced by
Diamond and Dybvig [24] and have random liquidity needs, banks perfectly insure against liquidity
fluctuations by exchanging interbank deposits, but the connections created by swapping deposits expose
the entire system to contagion. Based on such studies, Allen and Gale [3] concluded that incomplete
networks are more prone to contagion than networks with maximum connectivity since better-connected
networks are more resilient via transfer of proportion of the losses in one bank’s portfolio to more banks
through interbank agreements. On the other hand, Gai and Kapadia [33] argued that the higher is the
connectivity among banks the more will be the contagion effect during crisis. Freixas et al. [31] explored
the case of banks that face liquidity fluctuations due to the uncertainty about consumers withdrawing
funds. Haldane [34] suggested that contagion should be measured based on the interconnectedness
of each institution within the financial system. Liedorp et al. [47] argued that both large lending and
borrowing shares in interbank markets increase the riskiness of banks active in the dutch banking market.
Dasgupta [23] explored how linkages between banks, represented by cross-holding of deposits, can
be a source of contagious breakdowns by investigating how depositors, who receive a private signal
about fundamentals of banks, may want to withdraw their deposits if they believe that enough other
1For example, some such factors are the rumors and panics caused by the insolvency of a large bank and a possible subsequent
credit freeze. While fears, panics and rumors are all real aspects in networked economics, there are hardly any universally agreed
upon good way of modelling them.
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depositors will do the same. Lagunoff and Schreft [46] studies a network model in which the return on
an agents’ portfolio depends on the portfolio allocations of other agents. Iazzetta and Manna [38] used
network topology analysis on monthly data on deposits exchange to gain more insight into the way a
liquidity crisis spreads. Nier et al. [55] explored the dependency of systemic risks on the structure of
the banking system and the resilience (or lack thereof) of such a system to contagious defaults via graph
theoretic approach. Corbo and Demange [22] explored the relationship of the structure of interbank
connections to the contagion risk of defaults given the exogenous default of set of banks. Babus [7]
studied how the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of being linked changes depending on the
network structure, and observed that, when the network is maximal, liquidity can be redistributed in the
system to make the risk of contagion minimal.
Acemoglu et al. [1] and Zawadowski [64] do investigate stability of financial networks, but dif-
ferently from our study. Both [1] and [64] consider two specific network topologies, namely the ring
topology and the complete network topology, as opposed to a more general class of topologies in our
study. Both [1] and [64] consider only the effect of the shock propagation for a few discrete time steps, as
opposed to our study; in the terminology of [9], this can be thought of as a “violent death” of the network
as opposed to the “slow poisoning death” that our paper investigates. The model and structure/terms
of bilateral interbank agreements in [1], namely that banks lend to one another through debt contracts
with contingency covenants, is quite different from ours. As a results, the conclusions in [1, 64] do not
directly apply to our model and the corresponding simulation environment.
Attribute propagation models have been investigated in the past in other contexts such as influence
maximization in social networks [41, 18, 17, 13], disease spreading in urban networks [29, 19, 28], and
percolation models in physics and mathematics [61]. However, the shock propagation model in this
paper is very different from all these models. For example:
• Almost all of the other models include a trivial solution in which the attribute spreads to the entire
network if we inject each node individually with the attribute. This is not the case with the shock
propagation model.
• If shocking a subset of nodes makes x nodes in the network fail, then adding more nodes to this
subset may not necessarily lead to the failure of x or more than x nodes of the network.
• The complexity of many previous attribute propagation models arises due to the presence of cycles
in the graph. In contrast, the shock propagation model may be highly complex even when the given
network is acyclic. Instead, a key component of the complexity arises due to two or more directed
paths sharing a node.
3. Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
• In Section 5 we describe the network model and the corresponding stability measure. In particular:
• In Section 5.1 we define the balance sheet equations, and the two (homogeneous and heteroge-
neous) versions of our model that provide an appropriate formalization and extension of the basic
prior model of [25, 55].
• In Sections 5.2–5.3, we provide formalizations of how the initial failures of some nodes in the
network (i.e., a shock) originate, and how such failures are propagated to other network nodes in
successive time steps using a discrete-time shock propagation equation.
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• In Section 5.5 we define our global network stability measure K .
• In Sections 5.4 and 5.6, we provide rationales for the network model and the global stability
measure, respectively.
• In Section 6 we describe our simulation environment and the combinations of parameters that are
being explored. In particular:
• In Section 6.1, we discuss the random network models for generation of network topologies.
• In Section 6.2 we state and justify the two modes of initial failures (idiosyncratic and coordinated)
that are being used in the simulation.
• In Sections 6.3–6.4, we describe the combinations of parameters used for homogeneous and het-
erogeneous networks and few other minor details of the simulation environment.
• In Section 7 we discuss our findings from the evaluation of the stabilities of the networks. In partic-
ular:
• Our six conclusions①–⑥ for the stability measure involving various combinations of network
topology and parameters appear in Sections 7.1–7.4.
• In Section 7.5 we discuss two phase transition properties of the stability measure with an intuitive
explanation for one of them.
Though the issue of stability of financial systems has been discussed by prior researchers [25, 9, 16, 6, 1,
26, 43, 51, 45, 3, 24, 33, 31, 34, 47, 23, 46, 38, 55, 22, 7], no prior paper has performed a comprehensive
evaluation of a global stability measure as done in this paper.
4. Economic policy implications
Returning to our original motivation of flagging financial networks for potential vulnerabilities, our
results suggest that a network model similar to that used in the paper may be flagged for the following
cases:
• the equity to asset ratios of most banks are low,
• the network has a highly skewed distribution of external assets and inter-bank exposures among
its banks and the network is sufficiently sparse,
• the network does not have either a highly skewed distribution of external assets or a highly skewed
distribution of inter-bank exposures among its banks, but the network is sufficiently dense.
5. Our financial network model and stability measure
Since our model has a large number of parameters, for the benefit of the reader we have included a short
definition for major parameters at the beginning of each subsection where they are used.
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A list of major parameters used in this section
E total external asset I total inter-bank exposure γ ratio of equity to asset
w(e)
=
w(u,v)
weight of edge
e = (u,v)
ιv interbank asset ev
effective share of
total external asset
av total asset bv total interbank borrowing cv net worth (equity)
5.1 Network model and balance sheet
We state a formalization of an ex ante financial network model similar to what has been used by
researchers from Bank of England and elsewhere [25, 35, 55, 33, 49]. As was done by these prior
researchers, we formulate our model in terms of balance-sheet “insolvency cascades” in a network of
financial institutions (hereafter simply called “banks” and “banking networks”) with interlinked bal-
ance sheets, where losses flow into the asset side of the balance sheets. The same formulation can be
used to analyze cascades of cash-flow insolvency in over-the-counter derivatives markets. From now
on, we will refer to balance-sheet insolvency simply as insolvency.
The banking network is represented by a parameterized node-weighted and edge-weighted directed
graph G = (V,E,Γ ) in the following manner2:
• Γ = {E ,I ,γ} is the set of parameters where
– E ∈ R is the total external asset,
– I ∈ R is the total inter-bank exposure,
– A = I +E is the total asset, and
– γ ∈ (0,1) is the ratio of equity to asset.
• V is the set of n banks where
– the node weight σv ∈ [0,1] denotes the share of total external asset for each bank v ∈ V(
∑v σv = 1
)
.
• E represents the set of m direct inter-bank exposures where
– w(e) = w(u,v)> 0 is the weight of a directed edge e = (u,v) ∈ E .
The (interlocked) balance sheet for each node (bank) v ∈ V is shown in Table 1. Two types of
banking network models are considered:
Homogeneous model: E and I are equally distributed among the nodes and the edges, respectively,
i.e., σv = 1n for every node v, and w(e) =
I
m
for every edge e.
Heterogeneous model: E and I are not necessarily equally distributed among the nodes and the edges,
respectively.
Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network models are relevant in practice, and have been investi-
gated by prior researchers such as [9, 35, 55, 37, 33, 49].
2The parameters E , I , A, γ and Φ were also used by prior researchers, and the parameters σv and w(e) are generalizations of
parameters used by prior researchers.
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Table 1. Relevant balance sheet details of a node v in the network [25, 55, 9]. The total amount of external assets E is assumed to
be large enough such that bv− ιv +σv E is positive.
Assets Liabilities
ιv = ∑(v,u)∈E w(v,u) interbank asset
ev = bv− ιv +σv E effective share oftotal external asset
av = bv +σvE total asset
bv = ∑(u,v)∈E w(u,v) total interbankborrowing
cv = γ av net worth (equity)
5.2 Initial insolvency via shocks
A list of major parameters and definitions used in this section
V✖ set of initially shocked nodes Φ severity of initial shock t time variable
shocking mechanism:
rule to select an initial subset
of nodes to be shocked
The initial insolvencies of a banking network at time t = 0 are caused by “shocks” received by
a subset /0 ⊂ V✖ ⊆ V of nodes. Such shocks can occur, for example, due to operational risks (e.g.,
frauds3) or credit risks, and has the effect of reducing the external assets of an selected subset of banks4.
Mathematically, the effect of the initial shock is to simultaneously decrease the external assets of each
shocked node v ∈ V✖ from ev by sv = Φ ev, thereby reducing the net worth of v from its original value
cv to cv− sv, where (0,1] ∋Φ > γ is a parameter denoting the severity of the initial shock.
In the rest of the paper, by the phrase “shocking mechanism”, we refer to the rule that is used to
select the initial subset of nodes to be shocked5.
5.3 Insolvency propagation equation
A list of major parameters used in this section
deg in(v) in-degree of node v V✂ (t,V✖)
set of nodes that became insolvent before time t
when initial shock is provided to nodes in V✖
Let the notation deg in(v) denote the in-degree of node v. The insolvencies propagate in discrete time
units t = 0,1,2, . . . ; we add “(. . . , t,V✖, . . . )” to all relevant variables to indicate their dependences on t
and on the set V✖ of initially shocked nodes. A bank becomes insolvent if its modified net worth becomes
negative, and such a bank is removed from the network in the next time step. Let V✂ (t,V✖)⊆V denote
the set of nodes that became insolvent before time t when an initial shock is provided to the nodes 6 in
V✖. The insolvencies of banks at time t affect the equity of other banks in the network at the next time
3Iyer and Peydro [39] show that fraud is an important cause of bank insolvency.
4Nier et al. [55] considered shocking only one (or a few) bank and empirically studying the effect of the shock on the entire
network. Berman et al. [9], on the other hand, analyzed the computational complexity issues of the problem of selecting a subset
of nodes such that shocking them will make the network fail.
5Shocking mechanisms were not formally defined by prior researchers, but it was often implicit in their discussions.
6Thus, in particular, deg in
(
v,t,V✖
)
is the in-degree in the graph induced by the nodes in V \V✂
(
t,V✖
)
.
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FIG. 1. Pictorial illustration of the shock transmission equation for a node v from time t to time t +1.
step t + 1 by the following non-linear “insolvency propagation equation” 7,8:
∀u ∈V \V✂ (t,V✖) : cu (t + 1,V✖) = cu (t,V✖) - ∑
v :
(
cv(t,V✖)<0
)
∧(
v∈V\V✂(t,V✖)
)
∧(
(u,v)∈E
)
min
{
|cv (t,V✖) | , bv
}
deg in (v, t,V✖)
(5.1)
In Equation (5.1), the term |cv (t,V✖) |deg in (v, t,V✖)
ensures the loss of equity of an insolvent bank to be dis-
tributed equitably among its creditors that have not become insolvent yet, whereas the term bvdeg in (v, t,V✖)
ensures that the total loss propagated cannot be more than the total interbank exposure of the insolvent
bank; see FIG. 1 for a pictorial illustration. The insolvency propagation continues until no new bank
becomes insolvent. For notational convenience, we may use (. . . , t, . . . ) instead of (. . . , t,V✖, . . . ) when
V✖ is clear from the context or is irrelevant.
7An equation of same flavor with some simplification and omitted details was described in words by Nier et al. [55] and
Eboli [25].
8Equation (5.1) is highly non-linear. The results in [9] indicate that in general it is NP-hard to find a subset V✖ of initially
shocked nodes such that
∣∣∣ lim
t→∞V✂
(
t,V✖
)∣∣∣ is exactly or approximately maximized.
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5.4 Rationale for the network model and insolvency propagation equation
As prior researchers [55, 2, 43] have commented:
“conceptual frameworks from the theory of weighted graphs with additional parameters may provide
a powerful tool for analysis of banking network models”.
Several parametric graph-theoretic models, differing in the way edges are interpreted and additional
parameters are used to characterize the contagion, have been used by prior researchers in finance and
banking industry to study various research questions involving financial systems [9, 25, 35, 37, 55, 32,
63, 53, 5, 21, 62, 64]. As noted by researchers in [55, 5]:
“the modelling challenge in studying banking networks lies not so much in analyzing a model that is
flexible enough to represent all types of insolvency cascades, but in studying a model that can
mimic the empirical properties of these different types of networks”.
The insolvency propagation model formalized and evaluated in this paper using a mathematically precise
abstraction is similar to or a generalization of the models in [9, 25, 35, 55, 37, 33, 49, 5] that represent
cascades of cash-flow insolvencies. As [5] observes, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and similar
markets are prone to this type of cascades. In such markets parties deal directly with one another rather
than passing through an exchange, and thus each party is subject to the risk that the other party does not
fulfill its payment obligations. The following example from [5] illustrates chains of such interactions:
[5]“Consider two parties A and B, such that A has a receivable from party B upon the realization of
some event. If B does not dispose of enough liquid reserves, it will default on the payment. Now
consider that B has entered an off-setting contract with another party C, hedging its exposure to
the random event. If C is cash-flow solvent, then the payment will flow through the intermediary
B and reach A. However, if C is cash-flow insolvent and defaults, then the intermediary B might
become cash-flow insolvent if it depends on receivables from C to meet its payment obligations
to A”.
The length of such chains of interactions in some OTC markets, like the credit default swap market, is
significant [20, 50], thereby increasing the probability of cascade of cash-flow insolvencies [2]. As [55]
observes, an insolvency propagation model such as the one studied here
“conceptualises the main characteristics of a financial system using network theory by relating the
cascading behavior of financial networks both to the local properties of the nodes and to the
underlying topology of the network, allowing us to vary continuously the key parameters of the
network”.
Although the cascading effect studied is of somewhat special and simplified nature, as noted by [35]:
“This is a deliberate oversimplification, aimed at a clearer understanding of how an initial failure
can propagate shocks throughout the system”.
5.5 A measure of global stability9
Consider a banking network model as described in Sections 5.1–5.3. Let K ∈ (0,1] be a real number10
denoting the fraction of nodes in V that received the initial shock under a shocking mechanism ϒ and
9A mathematically precise definition of global stability measure was omitted by most prior researchers.
10K is a new parameter not used by prior researchers.
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A list of major parameters used in this section
ϒ a shocking mechanism ξ (K ,G,γ,Φ,ϒ ) = x
on an average 100x% nodes of the network become
insolvent with the given values of γ and Φ if we pro-
vide an initial shock to a random subset of 100K % of
nodes selected using the shocking mechanism ϒ
let Sϒ ,K be the set of all possible (K n)-element subsets of V . The vulnerability index11 of the network
is then defined as12
ξ (K ,G,γ,Φ,ϒ ) = 1
n
× E
[ ∣∣∣ lim
t→∞V✂ (t,V✖)
∣∣∣ : V✖ is selected randomly from Sϒ ,K ]
In the above definition, the 1
n
factor is only for a min-max normalization [36] to ensure that 0 6
ξ (K ,G,γ,Φ,ϒ ) 6 1. Noting that no new node in the network may fail at a time t > n, we may
simplify the above expression for ξ as:
ξ (K ,G,γ,Φ,ϒ ) = 1
n
× E[ ∣∣V✂ (n,V✖) ∣∣ : V✖ is selected randomly from Sϒ ,K ]
=⇒ Pr[ ∣∣V✂ (n,V✖) ∣∣ > nξ (K ,G,γ,Φ,ϒ ) : V✖ is selected randomly from Sϒ ,K ]> 0
As an example, ξ (0.1,G,0.3,0.5, random) = 0.9 means that with positive probability 90% nodes of the
network G become insolvent with γ = 0.3 and Φ = 0.5 if we provide an initial shock to a random subset
of 10% of nodes of G. Note that lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network. For
simplicity, we may omit the arguments of ξ when they are clear from the context. A pseudo-code for
calculating ξ is shown in Fig. 2.
5.6 Rationale for the global stability measure
It is possible to think of other alternate measures of global stability than the one quantified above.
However, the measure introduced above is in tune with the ideas that references [25, 55, 35, 37] directly
(and, some other references such as [32, 63, 49] implicitly) used to empirically study their networks.
Thus, in formalizing our global stability measure, we have decided to follow the cue provided by other
researchers in the banking industry who have studied various insolvency propagation models. Measures
of similar flavor have also been used by prior researchers in social networks in the context of influence
maximization [17, 18].
6. Simulation environment and explored parameter space
In Table 2 we provide a summary of our simulation environment and explored parameter space. Indi-
vidual components of the summary are discussed in Sections 6.1–6.4.
11Although simple topological properties such as clustering coefficients have been used by authors to study properties of net-
works [56, 60], they are too simplistic for stability analysis of financial networks.
12In this definition, we implicitly assume that the shocking mechanism ϒ allows one to select at least one set of K n nodes for
the initial shock. Otherwise, we define ξ to be zero.
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(∗ initialization of parameters ∗)
t ← 0 ; V✂ (0,V✖)← /0 ; continue=TRUE ;
V✖← set of Kn nodes selected for initial insolvency based on shocking mechanism ϒ
for every node v ∈V do
deg in (v,0,V✖)← deg in(v)
endfor
(∗ provide an initial shock ∗)
for every node u ∈V ′ do
cu (0,V✖)← cu−Φ eu
endfor
(∗ loop until no new node fails ∗)
while
((
continue=TRUE
)∧(
V✂ (t,V✖) 6=V
))
do
for every node u ∈V \V✂ (t,V✖) do
cu (t + 1,V✖)← cu (t,V✖)
for every node v ∈V \V✂ (t,V✖) do
if
((
cv (t,V✖)< 0
)∧(
(u,v) ∈ E )) then (∗ propagate shock to in-neighbors ∗)
cu (t + 1,V✖)← cu (t + 1,V✖)−
min
{∣∣cv (t,V✖) ∣∣ , bv}
deg in (v, t,V✖)
endfor
V✂ (t + 1,V✖)←V✂ (t,V✖) ;
if cu (t,V✖)< 0 then V✂ (t + 1,V✖)←V✂ (t + 1,V✖)∪
{
u
}
(∗ node u fails if its equity becomes negative ∗)
endfor
t ← t + 1
if
(
V✂ (t,V✖) =V✂ (t− 1,V✖)
)
then continue←FALSE
for every node u ∈V \V✂ (t,V✖) do
deg in (u, t,V✖) =
∣∣∣{v : ((v,u) ∈ E )∧ (v ∈V \V✂ (t,V✖) )}∣∣∣
(∗ update in-degrees of alive nodes to exclude freshly dead nodes ∗)
endfor
endwhile
ξ (K ,G,γ,Φ,ϒ )←
∣∣V✂ (t,V✖)∣∣
n
FIG. 2. Pseudo-code for calculating ξ (K ,G,γ ,Φ ,ϒ ). Comments in the pseudo-code are enclosed by (∗ and ∗). An implemen-
tation of the pseudo-code is available at www2.cs.uic.edu/
˜
dasgupta/financial-simulator-files.
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parameter explored values for the parameter
network type
homogeneous } totalnumber ofparametercombinations> 700,000(α,β )-heterogeneous α = 0.1, β = 0.95α = 0.2, β = 0.6network topology directed scale-free average degree 1 (in-arborescence)average degree 3average degree 6directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi average degree 3average degree 6shocking mechanism idiosyncratic, coordinatednumber of nodes 50, 100, 300E/I 0.25,0.5,0.75,1,1.25,1.5,1.75,2,2.25,2.5,2.75,3,3.25,3.5
Φ 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
K 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
γ 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, . . . ,Φ− 0.05
Table 2. A summary of simulation environment and explored parameter space.
6.1 Network topology13
We consider two topology models previously used by economists to generate random financial networks:
• the directed scale-free (SF) network model [8] that has been used by prior financial network
researchers such as [59, 54, 5, 21], and
• the directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) network model [11] that has been used by prior financial network
researchers such as [58, 33, 48, 22, 15].
root
L1 L2 L3 L4
FIG. 3. An in-arborescence graph.
Generation of directed ER networks is computationally triv-
ial: given a value 0 < p < 1 that parameterizes the ER net-
work, for every ordered pair of distinct nodes (u,v) we let
Pr
[
(u,v) ∈ E] = 1/p. Letting p = d/n generates a random ER
network whose average degree is d with high probability.
The directed SF networks in this paper are generated using
the algorithm outlined by Bollobas et al. [11]. The algorithm
works as follows. Let a, b, η , δin (in-degree) and δout (out-
degree) be non-negative real numbers with a+ b+η = 1. The initial graph G(0) at step ℓ = 0 has just
one node with no edges. At step ℓ > 0 the graph G(ℓ) has exactly ℓ edges and a random number nℓ of
nodes. For ℓ> 0, G(ℓ+ 1) is obtained from G(ℓ) by using the following rules:
13One may obviously ask: why not use “real” networks? There are several obstacles however that make this desirable goal
impossible to achieve. For example: (a) Due to their highly sensitive nature, such networks with all relevant parameters are rarely
publicly available. (b) For the kind of inferences that we make in this paper, we need hundreds of thousands of large networks to
have any statistical validity (in this paper, we explore more than 700,000 networks).
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• With probability a, add a new node v together with an edge from v to an existing node w, where
w is chosen randomly such that
Pr[w = u] =
(din(u)+ δin)
(ℓ+ δin nℓ)
for every existing node u, where din(u) is the in-degree of node u in G(ℓ).
• With probability b, add an edge from an existing node v to an existing node w, where v and w are
chosen independently, such that
Pr[v = u] =
dout(u)+ δout
ℓ+ δout nℓ
for every existing node u
Pr[w = u] =
din(u)+ δin
ℓ+ δin nℓ
for every existing node u
where dout(u) is the out-degree of node u in G(ℓ).
• With probability η , add a new node w and an edge from an existing node v to w, where v is chosen
such that Pr[v=u] =
dout(u)+ δout
ℓ+ δout nℓ
for every existing node u.
To study the effect of connectivity on network stability, we generated random SF and ER networks with
average degrees14 of 3 and 6.
In addition, to study the effect of sparse hierarchical topology on network stability, we used the
Bara´basi-Albert preferential-attachment model [8] to generate random in-arborescence networks. In-
arborescences are directed rooted trees with all edges oriented towards the root (see Fig. 3), and have
the following well-known topological properties:
• They belong to the class of sparsest connected directed acyclic graphs.
• They are hierarchical networks, i.e., the nodes can be partitioned into levels L1,L2, . . . ,Lp such
that L1 has exactly one node (the “root”) and nodes in any level Li have directed edges only to
nodes in Li−1 (see Fig. 3). The root may model a “central bank” that lends to other banks but does
not borrow from any bank.
The algorithm for generating a random in-arborescence network G using the preferential-attachment
model [8] is as follows:
• Initialize G = (V,E) to have one node (the root) and no edges.
• Repeat the following steps till G has n nodes:
– Randomly select a node u in G such that, for every node v in G, Pr[u = v] = deg(v)∑w∈V deg(w)
where deg(y) denotes the degree of node y in G.
– Add a new node x and an undirected edge {x,u} in G.
• Orient all the edges towards the root.
14There are many ways to fix the parameters to get the desired average degree. For example, as observed
in [11], letting δout = 0 and α > 0, one obtains E
[
number of nodes in G(t) of in-degree x
]
∝ x
−
(
1+ 1+δin(α+η)α+β
)
t and
E
[
number of nodes in G(t) of out-degree x
]
∝ x−(
2−α
1−α )t .
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6.2 Shocking mechanisms ϒ
Recall that a shocking mechanism ϒ provides a rule to select the initial subset of nodes to be shocked.
The following two mechanisms are used to select the nodes to receive the initial shock.
Idiosyncratic (random) shocking mechanism We select a subset of nodes uniformly at random. This
corresponds to random idiosyncratic initial insolvencies of banks, and is a choice that has been used by
prior researchers such as [55, 37, 35, 33, 49].
Coordinated shocking mechanism15. In this type of non-idiosyncratic correlated shocking mecha-
nism, we seek to play an adversarial role16 in selecting nodes for the initial shock that may cause more
damage to the stability of the network. The selection of an adversarial strategy depends on whether
the network is homogeneous or heterogeneous. The coordinated shocking mechanism falls under the
general category of correlated shocks where the nodes with high (weighted) in-degrees are correlated.
For homogeneous networks, recall that all nodes have the same share of the total external asset E .
However, the total interbank exposure bv of a node v is directly proportional to the in-degree of v, and,
as per Equation (5.1), nodes with higher inter-bank exposures are more likely to transmit the shock to
a larger number of other nodes. Thus, we play an adversarial role by selecting a set of K n nodes in
non-increasing order of their in-degrees starting from a node with the highest in-degree.
For heterogeneous networks, nodes with higher “weighted” in-degrees (i.e., with higher values of
the sum of weights of incoming edges) represent nodes that have larger external assets than other nodes,
and have more inter-bank exposures. Thus, for heterogeneous networks we play an adversarial role by
selecting K n nodes in non-increasing order of their weighted in-degrees starting from a node with the
highest weighted in-degree.
6.3 Network type: (α,β )-heterogeneous networks
Recall that in a heterogeneous network it is possible to have a few banks whose external assets or
interbank exposures are significantly larger than the rest of the banks, i.e., it is possible to have a few
banks that are “too big”, and thus heterogeneous networks permit investigation of the effect of such
big banks on the global stability of the entire network. To this end, we define a (α,β )-heterogeneous
network as follows.
DEFINITION 6.1 ((α,β )-heterogeneous network) Let V˜ ⊆V be a random subset V of αn nodes and let
E˜ be the set of edges that have at least one end-point from V˜ . For 0 < α,β < 1, a (α,β )-heterogeneous
network G = (V,E) is one in which the total external and internal assets are distributed in the following
manner:
Distribution of E :
15While correlated shocking mechanisms affecting a correlated subset of banks are relevant in practice, prior researchers such
as [55, 35, 37, 33, 49] have mostly used idiosyncratic shocking mechanisms. There are at least two reasons for this. Firstly,
idiosyncratic shocks are a cleaner way to study the stability of the topology of the banking network. Secondly, it is not a priori
clear what kind of correlations in the shocking mechanism would lead to failure of more nodes than idiosyncratic shocks in a
statistically significant way. Our coordinated shocking mechanism intuitively corresponds shocks in which banks that are “too
big to fail” in terms of their assets are correlated. Our conclusion ⑥ shows that coordinated shocks do indeed cause more
statistically significant damage to the stability of the network as opposed to random shocks.
16Usage of adversarial strategies in measuring the worst-case bounds for network properties are very common in the algorithmic
literature; see, for example, see the book [12].
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• distribute βE part of the total external asset E equally among the α n nodes in
V˜ , and
• distribute the remaining part (1−β )E of E equally among the remaining (1−
α)n nodes.
Distribution of I :
• Distribute βI part of the total interbank exposure I equally among a random
subset of α|E˜| of edges from the edges in E˜ , and
• distribute the remaining part (1− β )I of I equally among the remaining
|E|−α|E˜| edges.
We performed our simulations for (α,β )-heterogeneous networks for (α,β )= (0.1,0.95) and (α,β )=
(0.2,0.6). The combination (α,β ) = (0.1,0.95) corresponds to the extreme situation in which 95% of
the assets and exposures involve 10% of banks, thus creating a minority of banks that are significantly
larger than the remaining banks. The other combination (α,β ) = (0.2,0.6) corresponds to a less extreme
situation in which there are a larger number of moderately large banks.
6.4 Other minor details
To correct statistical biases, for each combinations of parameters, shock types and network types, we
generated 10 corresponding random networks and computed the average value of the vulnerability index
over these 10 runs. For ER and SF random networks, we selected the values of network generation
parameters such that the expected number of edges of the network is 3n or 6n depending on whether we
require the average degree of the network to be 3 or 6, respectively.
The minimum difference between two non-identical values of the average vulnerability index over
10 runs for two n-node networks is 1/(10n). Thus, to allow for minor statistical biases introduced by any
random graph generation method, we consider two vulnerability indices to be same (within the margin
of statistical error) if their absolute difference is no more than 1/(3n), which is above 1/(10n) but no more
than 0.7% of the total range of the vulnerability indices.
Finally, we can assume without loss of generality that I = m, since otherwise if µ = I
m
6= 1 then
we can divide each of the quantities ιv, bv and E by µ without changing the outcome of the insolvency
propagation procedure.
7. Results
In this section, we discuss our uncovering of many interesting relationships of the stability with other
relevant parameters of the network based on our comprehensive evaluation and analysis of this stabil-
ity measure. It is easy to see that there are many (at least several thousands, but significantly more in
most cases) networks in the original sets of networks that are compared in two different scenarios in
Tables 3,4,5,6,7,9,10,11 and related tables in the supplementary documents, thereby assuring the statis-
tical validity of the comparison results.
7.1 Effect of unequal distribution of total assets E and I
As our analysis shows, nodes with disproportionately large external assets affect the stability of the
entire network in an adverse manner, and more uneven distribution of assets among nodes in the network
makes the network less stable.
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7.1.1 Effect on global stability For the same value of the common parameters n, E
I
, K , Φ and γ ,
for the same for network type (ER, SF or in-arborescence) of same average degree (6, 3 or 1) and for
the same shocking mechanism ϒ (coordinated or idiosyncratic), we compared the value of ξ for the
homogeneous network with the corresponding values of ξ for (0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous and (0.2,0.6)-
heterogeneous networks. The comparison results shown in Table 3 show most of the entries as being at
least 90%. Thus, we conclude:
① networks with all nodes having the same external assets display higher stability over
similar networks with fewer nodes having disproportionately higher external assets.
Table 3. Comparison of stabilities of (α ,β)-heterogeneous networks with their homogeneous counter-parts over all parameter
ranges. The numbers are the percentages of data points for which ξ(α,β)−heterogeneous was at least ξhomogeneous.
In-arborescence ER
average degree 3
ER
average degree 6
SF
average degree 3
SF
average degree 6
α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.1 α = 0.2
β = 0.95 β = 0.6 β = 0.95 β = 0.6 β = 0.95 β = 0.6 β = 0.95 β = 0.6 β = 0.95 β = 0.6
coordinated
shock 66.91% 60.22% 99.26% 98.91% 98.46% 98.00% 98.22% 91.68% 99.13% 97.4%
idiosyncratic
shock 92.75% 81.79% 97.76% 96.81% 98.16% 97.61% 98.86% 94.84% 98.83% 97.22%
Formal intuition behind the conclusion in①
In spite of the highly non-linear nature of Equation (5.1), the following formal intuition may help to
explain the conclusion in①.
LEMMA 7.1 (see Section A of the appendix for a proof) Fix γ , Φ , E , I and the graph G. Consider any
node v ∈ V✖ and suppose that v fails due to the initial shock. For every edge (u,v) ∈ E , let ∆ homo(u)
and ∆ hetero(u) be the amount of shock received by node u at time t = 1 if G is homogeneous or hetero-
geneous, respectively. Then,
E [∆ hetero(u)]>
β
α
E [∆ homo(u)] =
9.5E [∆ homo(u)] , if (α,β ) = (0.1,0.95)
3E [∆ homo(u)] , if (α,β ) = (0.2,0.6)
Lemma 7.1 implies that E [∆ hetero(u)] is much bigger than E [∆ homo(u)], and thus more nodes are
likely to fail beyond t > 0 leading to a lower stability for heterogeneous networks.
7.1.2 Effect on residual instability For homogeneous networks, if the equity to asset ratio γ is close
enough to the severity of the shock Φ then the network almost always tends to be perfectly stable, as one
would intuitively expect. However, the above property is not true in general for highly heterogeneous
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networks in the sense that, even when γ is close to Φ , these networks (irrespective of their topologies
and densities) have a minimum amount of global instability (which we term as the residual instability)17.
In Table 4 and supplemental Tables S1–S9 we tabulated residual instabilities for different types of
homogeneous and heterogeneous networks under coordinated and idiosyncratic shocks. The numbers in
these tables show, for each combination of network types, |V |, shocking mechanism and values of Φ and
γ such that |Φ−γ|= 0.05, the percentage of networks with this combination for which the vulnerability
index ξ was less than 0.05, 0.1 or 0.2. As the reader will observe, all the numbers for heterogeneous
networks are significantly lower than their homogeneous counter-parts. Thus, we conclude:
② a heterogeneous network, in contrast to its corresponding homogeneous version, has a
residual minimum instability even if its equity to asset ratio is very large and close to the
severity of the shock.
7.2 Effect of total external assets
A controversial belief regarding the cause of the collapse of many major financial institutions around
2007 asserts that removal of the separation between investment and consumer banking allowed a ripple
effect of insolvencies of individual banks to other banks [27, 14]. In our setting, the quantity E/I
controls the total (normalized) amount of external investments of all banks in the network. Thus, varying
the ratio E/I allows us to investigate the role of the magnitude of total external investments on the
stability of our banking network (see Table 5). All the entries in Table 5 are close to 0, showing that
heterogeneous networks exhibited very small average changes in the vulnerability index ξ when E/I was
varied. Thus, we conclude:
③ for heterogeneous banking networks, global stabilities are affected very little by the
amount of the total external asset E in the system.
Visual illustrations of③ are shown in supplemental FIG. S4 and FIG. S5 for homogeneous and hetero-
geneous networks, respectively.
7.3 Effect of network connectivity
Although it is clear that connectivity properties of a banking network has a crucial effect on its stability,
prior researchers have drawn mixed conclusions on this. For example, Allen and Gale [3] concluded that
networks with less connectivity are more prone to contagion than networks with higher connectivity due
to improved resilience of banking network topologies with higher connectivity via transfer of proportion
of the losses in one bank’s portfolio to more banks through interbank agreements. On the other hand,
Babus [7] observed that, when the network connectivity is higher, liquidity can be redistributed in the
system to make the risk of contagion lower, and Gai and Kapadia [33] observed that higher connectivity
among banks leads to more contagion effect during a crisis. The mixed conclusions arise because links
between banks have conceptually two conflicting effects on contagion, namely,
17For visual illustrations to this phenomena, see supplemental FIG. S1–S3. For example, in supplemental FIG. S1, when γ is
45% and Φ is only 5% more than γ , the vulnerability index ξ is approximately 0 for all the 9 combinations of parameters, but in
supplemental FIG. S2–S3 all the 18 networks have a value of ξ > 0.1 even when γ is 45% and the severity of the shock is only
5% more than γ .
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Table 4. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages shown
are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2. See also supplementary Tables S1–S9.
coordinated shock
Φ = 0.5,γ = 0.45 Φ = 0.5,γ = 0.40
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |
=
50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 73% 73% 73% 0% 31% 59%
ER, average degree 3 89% 100% 100% 43% 84% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 44% 84% 100% 25% 57% 88%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 6 8% 9% 10% 2% 6% 6%
SF, average degree 3 2% 6% 15% 0% 2% 5%
SF, average degree 6 18% 23% 30% 9% 10% 11%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 4% 7% 19% 2% 6% 16%
ER, average degree 6 8% 12% 24% 6% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 2% 6% 22% 0% 2% 18%
SF, average degree 6 8% 12% 24% 7% 8% 16%
|V |
=
100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 73% 73% 73% 0% 34% 73%
ER, average degree 3 66% 100% 100% 25% 64% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 29% 61% 100% 20% 42% 83%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 90% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 1%
ER, average degree 6 6% 6% 6% 4% 6% 6%
SF, average degree 3 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 3%
SF, average degree 6 6% 10% 15% 6% 6% 6%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 0% 6% 16% 0% 4% 16%
ER, average degree 6 6% 7% 16% 6% 6% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 2% 14% 0% 1% 13%
SF, average degree 6 7% 8% 17% 6% 7% 16%
|V |
=
300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 73% 73% 73% 0% 55% 73%
ER, average degree 3 71% 97% 100% 22% 60% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 22% 44% 86% 18% 36% 74%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 88% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 1%
ER, average degree 6 6% 6% 6% 0% 6% 6%
SF, average degree 3 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 2%
SF, average degree 6 6% 6% 16% 6% 6% 6%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 0% 6% 16% 0% 4% 16%
ER, average degree 6 6% 6% 16% 6% 6% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 0% 13% 0% 0% 12%
SF, average degree 6 6% 7% 16% 6% 6% 16%
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Table 5. Absolute values of the largest change of the vulnerability index ξ in the range 0.25 6 E/I 6 3.5.
average values of
∣∣∣ max
0.256 E
I
63.5
{ξ}− min
0.256 E
I
63.5
{ξ}∣∣∣
coordinated shock idiosyncratic shock
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous in-arborescence 0.017 0.045
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous in-arborescence 0.007 0.017
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous ER, average degree 3 0.066 0.073
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous ER, average degree 3 0.040 0.041
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous ER, average degree 6 0.111 0.116
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous ER, average degree 6 0.084 0.078
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous SF, average degree 3 0.119 0.094
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous SF, average degree 3 0.034 0.032
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous SF, average degree 6 0.200 0.179
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous SF, average degree 6 0.054 0.054
• more interbank links increases the opportunity for spreading insolvencies to other banks,
• but, more interbank links also provide banks with co-insurance against fluctuating liquidity flows.
As our findings show, these two conflicting effects have different strengths in homogeneous versus
highly heterogeneous networks, thus justifying the mixed conclusions of past researchers.
Table 6. Effect of connectivity on the stability for homogeneous networks under coordinated and idiosyncratic shocks. The
percentage shown for a comparison of the type “network A versus network B” indicates the percentage of data points for which
the stability of networks of type A was at least as much as that of networks of type B.
ER average degree 3 versus ER average degree 6 SF average degree 3 versus SF average degree 6
coordinated shock idiosyncratic shock coordinated shock idiosyncratic shock
97.43% 97.05% 98.89% 98.29%
Homogeneous networks Recall that in a homogeneous network all banks have the same external asset.
Table 6 shows sparser homogeneous networks with lower average degrees to be more stable for same
values of other parameters. Thus, we conclude:
④ for homogeneous networks, higher connectivity leads to lower stability.
Heterogeneous networks In a heterogeneous network, there are banks that are “too big” in the sense
that these banks have much larger external assets and inter-bank exposures compared to the remaining
STABILITY OF FINANCIAL NETWORKS
Table 7. Effect of connectivity on the stability under coordinated and idiosyncratic shocks for (A) (α ,β)-heterogeneous ER and
SF networks and (B) (α ,β)-heterogeneous in-arborescence versus (α ,β)-heterogeneous SF networks. The percentage shown for
a comparison of the type “network A versus network B” indicates the percentage of data points for which the stability of networks
of type A was at least as much as that of networks of type B.
(0,1,0.95) ER average degree 6 (0.2,0.6) ER average degree 6 (0,1,0.95) SF average degree 6 (0.2,0.6) SF average degree 6
versus versus versus versus
(0,1,0.95) ER average degree 3 (0.2,0.6) ER average degree 3 (0,1,0.95) SF average degree 3 (0.2,0.6) SF average degree 3
coordinated idiosyncratic coordinated idiosyncratic coordinated idiosyncratic coordinated idiosyncratic
shock shock shock shock shock shock shock shock
89.3% 82.39% 68.12% 61.46% 85.51% 73.81% 69.29% 73.07%
(A)
(0,1,0.95) SF average degree 3 and average degree 6 (0.2,0.6) SF average degree 3 and average degree 6
versus versus
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous in-arborescence (SF ave. degree 1) (0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous in-arborescence (SF ave. degree 1)
coordinated shock idiosyncratic shock coordinated shock idiosyncratic shock
85.7% 81.86% 56.21% 51.07%
(B)
banks. Table 7 shows that for heterogeneous network models denser networks with higher average
degree are more stable than the corresponding sparser networks for same values of other parameters,
especially when the heterogeneity of the network is larger (i.e., when α = 0.1,β = 0.95). Thus, we
conclude:
⑤ for heterogeneous networks, higher connectivity leads to higher stability.
Formal intuition behind the conclusions in④ and⑤
Informally, conclusions④ and⑤ indicate that in homogeneous networks higher connectivity leads to
more opportunity for spreading insolvencies to other banks whereas in heterogeneous networks higher
connectivity provides banks with co-insurance against fluctuating liquidity flows through shared inter-
bank assets. However, a precise formal treatment of mechanism that drives such conclusions is com-
plicated due to several reasons such as the random nature of the networks, the randomness in asset
distribution for heterogeneous networks and the non-linear nature of the insolvency propagation equa-
tion. Nevertheless, we provide the following, somewhat simplified, formal reasoning. We will use the
following notations and conventions18:
• degave = |E|n will denote the average degree of a graph G. It is assumed that degave is a small
positive integer constant independent of n (e.g., in our simulation work, degave ∈ {1,3,6}).
• ∆x will denote a small change for the value x of a variable.
18In standard algorithmic analysis terminologies, f ≈ g implies f (r)g(r) = 1±o(1).
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• For two functions f (r) and g(r) of a variable r, we will use the notation f ≈ g (respectively, f / g,
f ' g) if lim
r→∞
f (r)
g(r) = 1 (respectively, limr→∞
f (r)
g(r) 6 1, limr→∞
f (r)
g(r) > 1).
• The standard phrase “with high probability” (or w.h.p. in short) refers to a probability p(n)
such that limn→∞ p(n) = 0.
• If necessary, we will use the superscripts “homo” and “hetero” to denote the value of a quantity
for homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, respectively.
Consider a node v ∈ V✖ with deg in(v) > 1 and suppose that v fails due to the initial shock at t = 0.
By Equation (5.1), for every edge (u,v) ∈ E , the amount of shock u receives from v is given by B =
min
{
A, c1
}
with
A =
Φ
(
c1 deg in(v)− c1 degout(v)+ c2 E
) − γ (c1 deg in(v)+ c2 E )
deg in(v)
= c1
(
Φ− γ)+ c2(Φ− γ) Edeg in(v) − c1Φ degout(v)deg in(v) (7.1)
for some appropriate positive quantities c1 and c2 that may be estimated as follows:
• If G is homogeneous then chomo1 = Indegave = 1 and chomo2 = 1n .
• If G is (α,β )-heterogeneous then chetero1 and chetero2 are random variables independent of degave.
Using the notations in Definition 6.1 the expected value of chetero2 may be estimated as follows:
E
[
chetero2
]
=
Pr
[
v ∈ V˜
] β E
α n +Pr
[
v /∈ V˜
]
(1−β )E
(1−α)n
E
=
α β Eα n +(1−α) (1−β )E(1−α)n
E
=
1
n
The expected value of chetero1 depend on the nature (SF or ER) of the random network; its estima-
tion is therefore deferred until later.
Our goal is to provide evidence for a claim of the following nature for either random SF or random ER
networks:
For many realistic network parameter combinations, w.h.p. increasing connectivity from
d to d +∆d decreases the expected amount of shock transmitted by a failed node v to u in
homogeneous networks (causing improved stability) but increases the expected amount of
shock transmitted by a failed node v to u in heterogeneous networks (leading to worse
stability).
The case of random SF networks If G is a directed SF network, then the discrete probability density
function for the degree of any node v in G is given by:
∀k ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n− 1} : Pr[deg in(v) = k] = Pr[degout(v) = k]=C k−µ
where µ > 2 is the constant for the exponent of the distribution and C > 0 is a constant such that
E
[
deg in(v)
]
= E [degout(v)] = degave. For example, for our random in-arborescence networks, the
results in [8] imply µ = 3. To simplify exposure, in the following we assume that µ = 3, though
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the analysis can be extended in a straightforward manner for any other µ > 2. ζ (s) = ∑∞x=1 x−s is the
well-known Riemann zeta function; it is well known that ζ (s)≈∑n−1x=1 x−s for any s > 2 and for all large
n (see [44, page 74-75]) and ζ (s)< 2s−12s−1−1 for any s > 1 (see [44, page 489]). In particular, it is known
that ζ (2) = pi26 , ζ (3) = 1.2020569 · · · and ζ (4) = pi
4
90 . Note that
E
[
deg in(v)
]
= degave ≡
n−1
∑
k=1
k
(
Ck−3
)
= degave ⇒ C ≈ degaveζ (2) =
6degave
pi2
LEMMA 7.2 (see Section B of the appendix for a proof) E
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0] ≈ pi215 degave and
Var
[
deg in(v)
]
≈ 6degave
pi2
lnn.
We now provide an estimation of chetero1 using the notations in Definition 6.1.
LEMMA 7.3 (see Section C of the appendix for a proof) W.h.p. 1+α − β − α β2 6 E
[
chetero1
]
6
1+α β−α2−β−α2 β
1−2α .
Due to the above lemma, we may assume that
w.h.p.
0.1568756 E
[
chetero1
]
6 0.16, if G is (0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
0.54 6 E
[
chetero1
]
6 0.76, if G is (0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
We will investigate the sensitivity of the amount of shock A transmitted from v to u as the average
degree degave is changed while keeping all other parameters the same. For notational convenience, the
parameters are normalized such that I = ndegave at the initial value d of degave. As degave is increased
from d to d +∆d, I is still kept the same. Thus,
I
∣∣∣ at
degave=d+∆d
= I
∣∣∣ at
degave=d
⇒ chomo1
∣∣∣ at
degave=d+∆d
=
I
∣∣∣ at
degave=d+∆d
n (d+∆d) =
nd
n (d+∆d) =
d
d+∆d
Equation (7.1) gives the following for homogeneous and heterogeneous networks:
• If G is a homogeneous network then
E
[
A
homo ∣∣degave = d]
≈ (Φ− γ)+ E (Φ − γ)
n
E
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0]−ΦE[degout(v)] E[ 1deg in(v) ∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0
]
=
(
Φ− γ)+ pi2 E (Φ− γ)
15n d−
pi2 Φ
15 d
2
E
[
A
homo ∣∣degave = d+∆d]
≈ dd+∆d
(
Φ− γ)+ E (Φ−γ)
n
E
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0]− dd+∆d Φ E [degout(v)] E[ 1deg in(v) ∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0]
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=
d
d +∆d
(
Φ− γ)+ pi2 E (Φ− γ)
15n
(
d+∆d
)− dd+∆d pi2 Φ15 (d+∆d)2
∆E
[
A
homo]
= E
[
A
homo ∣∣degave = d +∆d]− E[Ahomo ∣∣degave = d]
≈ − ∆dd+∆d
(
Φ− γ)+ pi2 E (Φ− γ)
15n ∆d−
pi2 Φ
15 d ∆d
• If G is a heterogeneous network then
E
[
A
hetero]= (Φ− γ)E[chetero1 ]+ E (Φ− γ)n E
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0]
−ΦE
[
chetero1
]
E
[
degout(v)
]
E
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0]
which provides the following bounds:
E
[
A
hetero ∣∣degave = d]≈ (Φ − γ)E[chetero1 ]+ pi2 E (Φ − γ)15n d− pi2 Φ15 d2E[chetero1 ]
E
[
A
hetero ∣∣degave = d +∆d]≈ (Φ − γ)E[chetero1 ]+ pi2 E (Φ − γ)15n (d+∆d)− pi2 Φ15 d2E[chetero1 ]
∆E
[
A
hetero]= E[Ahetero ∣∣degave = d+∆d]− E[Ahetero ∣∣degave = d]
≈ pi
2 E
(
Φ− γ)
15n ∆d−
pi2 Φ
15 d ∆dE
[
chetero1
]
Now note that
∆E
[
A
homo]/ 0 ⇒ Φ− γd +∆d + pi2 Φ d15 > pi2 E
(
Φ− γ)
15n
≡
(
1
d+∆d +
pi2 d
15 −
pi2 E
15n
)
Φ >
(
1
d +∆d −
pi2 E
15n
)
γ (7.2)
∆E
[
A
hetero]' 0 ⇒ E (Φ− γ)
n
> Φ dE
[
chetero1
]
≡
(
E
n
− dE
[
chetero1
])
Φ >
(
E
n
)
γ
⇒ w.h.p.
(
E
n
− d 1+α β −α
2−β −α2 β
1− 2α
)
Φ >
(
E
n
)
γ (7.3)
It is easy to verify that constraints (7.2) and (7.3) are satisfied for many natural combinations of parame-
ters. In fact, the constraints (7.2) and (7.3) are almost always satisfied when E grows moderately linearly
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with n. To see this informally, note that since α ≪ β and α is small, 1+α β −α
2−β −α2 β
1− 2α ≈ 1−β
and thus (7.3) is approximately (
E
n
− d (1−β )
)
Φ >
(
E
n
)
γ (7.3′)
Now suppose that E < d(1− β )n. Then, (7.2) and ((7.3′)) are always satisfied since Φ > γ . For a
numerical example, suppose that G is a (0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous network (i.e., α = 0.1 and β = 0.95),
d = 3, ∆d = 1, γ = 0.2 and Φ = 0.4. Then constraints (7.2) and (7.3) reduce to:
0.5+ 0.4pi2− 2pi
2 E
15n > 0.25−
pi2 E
15n and
2E
n
− 0.94125> E
n
and these constraints can be satisfied when E grows moderately linearly with n, i.e., when 0.94125n <
E < 6.38n.
The case of random ER networks In a random ER network, the probability of having a particular
edge is given by the following set of independent Bernoulli trials:
∀u,v ∈V with u 6= v : Pr [(u,v) ∈ E] = p = degave
n− 1
Thus, for every k ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,n− 1}:
Pr
[
deg in(v) = k
]
= Pr
[
degout(v) = k
]
=
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)(n−1)−k
E
[
deg in
]
= E
[
degout
]
= p(n− 1) = degave
Var
[
deg in(v)
]
= Var
[
degout(v)
]
= p(1− p)(n− 1)=
(
1− degave
n− 1
)
degave
Since degave = p(n− 1) is a constant, one can approximate the above binomial distribution by a Pois-
son’s distribution [57, page 72] to obtain
Pr
[
deg in(v) = k
]
= Pr
[
degout(v) = k
]≈ e−degave (degave)kk!
LEMMA 7.4 (see Section D of the appendix for a proof)
∣∣∣∣∣E[ 1deg in(v)]− ⌊3degave+10⌋∑k=1(1/k) e−degave (degave)kk!
∣∣∣∣∣/
10−10 and ∂∂ dE
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣degave = d]≈ 1−e−dd .
For notational convenience, let ϒ (x) =
⌊3x+10⌋
∑
k=1
1
k e
−x xk
k! . Since 10
−10 is an extremely small number for
our purposes, we will just use E
[
1
deg in(v)
]
≈ϒ (degave) in the sequel. Values of ϒ (x) and ∂ ϒ (x)∂ x = 1−e
−x
x
for a few small integral values of x are shown in Table 8. It is easy to see that lim
x→∞ϒ (x) = 0 and, for
large x, ∂ ϒ (x)∂ x ≈ 1/x.
As before, we first provide an estimation of chetero1 using the notations in Definition 6.1.
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Table 8. Values of ϒ (x) and ∂ ϒ (x)∂ x for a few small integral values of x using straightforward calculations.
x =
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
ϒ (x)≈ 0.499 0.411 0.324 0.256 0.207 0.172 0.147 0.128 0.113 0.101 0.091
∂ ϒ (x)
x
≈ 0.432 0.284 0.245 0.256 0.199 0.166 0.143 0.125 0.111 0.100 0.090
LEMMA 7.5 (see Section E of the appendix for a proof) W.h.p. 1+α −β − α β
2
6 E
[
chetero1
]
6
1+α β −α2−β −α2 β
1− 2α .
Using the above result, the following bounds hold:
• If G is a homogeneous network then
∂
∂ d c
homo
1
∣∣∣ at
degave=d
= lim
∆d→0
I
∣∣∣ at
degave=d+∆d
n (d +∆d) −
I
∣∣∣ at
degave=d
nd
∆d = lim∆d→0
nd
n (d +∆d) − 1
∆d = −
1
d
E
[
A
homo ∣∣degave = d]
= chomo1
(
Φ− γ)+ E (Φ− γ)
n
E
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0]− chomo1 Φ E[degout(v)] E[ 1deg in(v) ∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0
]
≈ chomo1
(
Φ− γ)+ E (Φ− γ)
n
ϒ (d)− chomo1 Φ dϒ(d)
∂
∂ dE
[
A
homo ∣∣degave = d]
≈ (Φ− γ) ∂∂ d chomo1 ∣∣∣ atdegave=d + E
(
Φ− γ)
n
∂
∂ dϒ (d)−Φ
∂
∂ d
(
chomo1
∣∣∣ at
degave=d
dϒ (d)
)
= − Φ− γd +
(
E
(
Φ− γ)
n
)(
1− e−d
d
)
−Φ
(
−ϒ (d)+ϒ (d)+ 1− e−d
)
using product rule
of derivatives
= − Φ− γd +
(
E
(
Φ− γ)
n
)(
1− e−d
d
)
−Φ
(
1− e−d
)
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• If G is a heterogeneous network then
E
[
A
hetero]= (Φ − γ)E[chetero1 ]+ E (Φ− γ)n E
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0]
−Φ E
[
chetero1
]
E
[
degout(v)
]
E
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0]
which provides the following bounds w.h.p.:
E
[
A
hetero ∣∣degave = d]≈ (Φ− γ)E[chetero1 ]+ E (Φ− γ)n ϒ (d)−Φ dϒ (d)E[chetero1 ]
∂
∂ dE
[
A
hetero ∣∣degave = d]
'
E
(
Φ− γ)
n
∂
∂ dϒ (d)−Φ
(
1+α β −α2−β −α2 β
1− 2α
) ∂
∂ d
(
dϒ(d)
)
=
(
E
(
Φ− γ)
n
)(
1− e−d
d
)
−Φ
(
1+α β −α2−β −α2 β
1− 2α
) (
1− e−d +ϒ (d)
) using product
rule of
derivatives
Now note the following:
∂
∂ dE
[
A
homo ∣∣degave = d]/ 0
⇒ Φ− γd +Φ
(
1− e−d
)
>
(
E
(
Φ− γ)
n
)(
1− e−d
d
)
≡
(
1
d + 1− e
−d− E
n
(
1− e−d
d
))
Φ >
(
1
d −
E
n
(
1− e−d
d
))
γ (7.4)
∂
∂ dE
[
A
hetero ∣∣degave = d]' 0
⇒
(
E
(
Φ− γ)
n
)(
1− e−d
d
)
> Φ
(
1+α β −α2−β −α2 β
1− 2α
) (
1− e−d +ϒ (d)
)
≡
(
E
n
(
1−e−d
d
)
−
(
1+α β−α2−β−α2 β
1−2α
) (
1− e−d +ϒ(d)))Φ > E
n
(
1−e−d
d
)
γ (7.5)
It is easy to verify that constraints (7.4) and (7.5) are satisfied for many natural combinations of param-
eters. For example, the constraints (7.4) and (7.5) are almost always satisfied if d is sufficiently large.
To see this informally, note that if d is large then 1d ,e
−d ,ϒ (d) ≈ 0. Moreover, since α ≪ β and α is
small, 1+α β−α
2−β−α2 β
1−2α ≈ 1−β and then constraints (7.4) and (7.5) reduce to(
1− E
nd
)
Φ ' − E
nd γ ≡ Φ /
E
nd
E
nd − 1
γ (7.4)d≫0
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Table 9. Comparisons of strengths of coordinated versus idiosyncratic shocks. The percentages indicate the percentage of total
number of data points (combinations of parameters Φ , γ , E and K ) for that network type that resulted in ξc > ξr , where ξc and
ξr are the vulnerability indices under coordinated and idiosyncratic shocks, respectively.
(α,β )-heterogeneous networks
In-arborescence ER average degree 3 ER average degree 6 SF average degree 3 SF average degree 6
α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.1 α = 0.2
β = 0.95 β = 0.6 β = 0.95 β = 0.6 β = 0.95 β = 0.6 β = 0.95 β = 0.6 β = 0.95 β = 0.6
56.64% 57.27% 89.66% 90.97% 98.99% 98.04% 93.16% 64.13% 94.44% 66.48%
homogeneous networks
In-arborescence ER average degree 3 ER average degree 6 SF average degree 3 SF average degree 6
84.62% 74.97% 78.59% 81.15% 54.80%
(
E
nd − 1+β
)
Φ ' E
nd γ ≡ Φ '
E
nd
E
nd − 1+β
γ (7.5)d≫0
If E > nd then
E
nd
E
nd−1
> 1 and
E
nd
E
nd−1+β
<
E
nd
E
nd−1
; thus both (7.4)d≫0 and (7.5)d≫0 can be satisfied by
choosing Φ appropriately with respect to γ . For a numerical example, suppose that G is a (0.1,0.95)-
heterogeneous network (i.e., α = 0.1 and β = 0.95), d = 10, and E = 12n. Then constraints (7.4),(7.5)
reduce to:
1.17 < Φγ < 11
which corresponds to most settings of Φ and γ used in our simulation.
7.4 Random versus correlated initial failures
For most parameter combinations, our results, tabulated in Table 9, show that coordinated shocks, which
are a type of correlated shocks, resulted in insolvencies of higher number of nodes as opposed to idiosyn-
cratic shocks for the same network with the same parameters, often by a factor of two or more. For
example, Table 9 shows that for (0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous ER networks of average degree 6 the vulner-
ability index under coordinated shocks is at least as much as the vulnerability index under idiosyncratic
shocks 98.99% of the time. Thus, we conclude:
⑥ correlated shocking mechanisms are more appropriate to measure the worst-case sta-
bility compared to idiosyncratic shocking mechanisms.
For visual illustrations of⑥, see supplemental FIG. S6—S11.
7.5 Phase transition properties of stability
Phase transitions are quite common when one studies various topological properties of graphs [10].
The stability measure exhibits several sharp phase transitions for various banking networks and com-
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binations of parameters; see supplemental FIG. S1—S4 for visual illustrations. We discuss two such
interesting phase transitions in the following, with an intuitive theoretical explanation for one of them.
7.5.1 Dense homogeneous networks Based on the behavior of ξ with respect to (Φ− γ), we observe
that, for smaller value of K and for denser ER and SF networks under either coordinated or idiosyn-
cratic shocks, there is often a sharp decrease of stability when γ was decreased beyond a particular
threshold value. For example, with Φ = 0.5 and K = 0.1, 100-node dense (average degree 6) SF and
ER homogeneous networks exhibited more than ninefold increase in ξ around γ = 0.15 and γ = 0.1,
respectively; see supplemental FIG. S1 for visual illustrations.
To investigate the global extent of such a sharp decrease at a threshold value of γ in the range[
0.05,0.2
]
, we computed, for each of the five homogeneous network types under coordinated shocks
and for each values of the parameters |V |, Φ , E
I
and K , , the ratio
Λ
(
n,Φ, E
I
,K
)
=
max
0.056γ60.2
{ξ}− min
0.056γ60.2
{ξ}
max
entire range of γ
{ξ}− min
entire range of γ
{ξ}
that provides the maximum percentage of the total change of the vulnerability index that occurred within
this narrow range of γ . The values of Λ
(
n,Φ, E
I
,K
)
for the dense ER and SF homogeneous networks
under coordinated shocks are shown in Table 10 for Φ = 0.5,0.8 and K = 0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5 (the
behaviour of ξ is similar for other intermediate values of Φ). If the growth of ξ with respect to γ was
uniform or near uniform over the entire range of γ , Λ would be approximately λ = 0.2−0.050.45−0.05 = 0.375;
thus, any value of Λ significantly higher than λ indicates a sharp transition within the above-mentioned
range of values of γ . As Table 10 shows, a significant majority of the entries for Φ 6 0.8 and κ 6 0.2
are 2λ or more.
7.5.2 Homogeneous in-arborescence networks Homogeneous in-arborescence networks under coor-
dinated shocks exhibited a sharp increase in stability as the ratio E
I
of the total external asset to the total
interbank exposure the system is increased beyond a particular threshold provided the equity to asset
ratio γ was approximately Φ/2. For example, for a 50-node homogeneous in-arborescence network
under coordinated shock, ξ exhibited a sharp decrease from 0.76 to 0.18 for E
I
∈ [0.75,1], K = 0.1,
Φ = 0.5 and γ = 0.25 = Φ/2; see supplemental FIG. S4 for a visual illustration.
To investigate the global extent of such a sharp decrease of ξ around a threshold value of E
I
in the
range
[
0.5,1
]
with γ ≈ Φ/2, we computed, for each type of shocking mechanism, and for each values of
the parameters n, Φ , γ ≈ Φ/2, and κ of the homogeneous in-arborescence network, the ratio
∆(n,Φ,γ,K ) =
max
0.56 E
I
61
{ξ}− min
0.56 E
I
61
{ξ}
max
entire range of E
{ξ}− min
entire range of E
{ξ}
that provides the maximum percentage of the total change of the vulnerability index that occurred within
this range of E
I
. If the growth of ξ with respect to E/I was uniform or near uniform over the entire
range of E
I
, ∆ would be approximately δ = 1−0.53.5−0.25 ≈ 0.16; thus, any value of ∆ significantly higher
than δ indicates a sharp transition within the above-mentioned range of E/I . As Table 11 shows, when
γ = Φ/2 a significant majority of the entries are coordinated shocks and many entries under idiosyncratic
shocks are at least 2δ .
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Table 10. Values of Λ (n,Φ ,E/I,K )=
max
0.056γ60.2
{ξ}− min
0.056γ60.2
{ξ}
max
entire range of γ
{ξ}− min
entire range of γ
{ξ} for homogeneous dense ER and SF networks under
coordinated shocks. Entries that are at least 2×0.375 are shown in boldface.
Φ = 0.5 Φ = 0.8
ER average degree 6 SF average degree 6 ER average degree 6 SF average degree 6
K = K = K = K =
E/I |V | 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.25
50 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.7 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.78 0.72
100 0.8 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.9 0.84 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.95 0.86 0.79 0.71 0.66
300 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.9 0.88 0.83 0.8 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.89 0.79 0.71 0.63 0.59
0.5
50 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.74 0.68 0.95 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.72
100 0.8 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.9 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.94 0.85 0.78 0.71 0.65
300 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.9 0.88 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.7 0.88 0.78 0.7 0.63 0.61
0.75
50 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.84 0.78 0.77 0.73 0.67 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.71
100 0.8 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.9 0.83 0.82 0.8 0.76 0.71 0.94 0.85 0.77 0.7 0.65
300 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.9 0.88 0.83 0.8 0.78 0.74 0.69 0.9 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.61
1
50 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.88 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.72 0.67 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.76 0.69
100 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.78 0.98 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.83 0.81 0.8 0.76 0.7 0.95 0.83 0.74 0.66 0.61
300 0.87 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.77 0.97 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.74 0.69 0.86 0.71 0.61 0.57 0.55
1.25
50 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.88 0.82 0.84 0.79 0.79 0.73 0.67 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.76 0.69
100 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.78 0.98 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.83 0.82 0.8 0.76 0.7 0.95 0.83 0.74 0.67 0.61
300 0.87 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.77 0.97 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.83 0.8 0.78 0.74 0.68 0.86 0.7 0.63 0.59 0.56
1.5
50 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.88 0.82 0.84 0.8 0.79 0.72 0.65 0.94 0.89 0.83 0.76 0.69
100 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.78 0.98 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.74 0.68 0.94 0.81 0.72 0.67 0.62
300 0.87 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.77 0.97 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.82 0.8 0.77 0.73 0.67 0.85 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.56
1.75
50 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.88 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.65 0.94 0.89 0.82 0.76 0.69
100 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.78 0.98 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.83 0.8 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.93 0.81 0.73 0.67 0.63
300 0.87 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.77 0.97 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.82 0.8 0.77 0.72 0.66 0.83 0.68 0.61 0.6 0.59
2
50 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.72 0.65 0.94 0.89 0.8 0.72 0.64
100 0.8 0.84 0.8 0.78 0.76 0.98 0.89 0.81 0.71 0.69 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.72 0.64 0.93 0.78 0.69 0.65 0.6
300 0.85 0.83 0.8 0.78 0.75 0.95 0.88 0.79 0.72 0.61 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.81 0.64 0.59 0.58 0.57
2.25
50 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.72 0.65 0.94 0.88 0.8 0.72 0.63
100 0.8 0.84 0.8 0.78 0.76 0.98 0.89 0.81 0.71 0.69 0.83 0.8 0.77 0.7 0.62 0.93 0.78 0.7 0.65 0.6
300 0.85 0.83 0.8 0.78 0.75 0.95 0.88 0.79 0.72 0.61 0.82 0.8 0.77 0.71 0.64 0.8 0.65 0.6 0.6 0.56
2.5
50 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.71 0.64 0.94 0.87 0.77 0.69 0.61
100 0.8 0.84 0.8 0.78 0.76 0.98 0.89 0.81 0.71 0.69 0.81 0.8 0.76 0.69 0.6 0.92 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.58
300 0.85 0.83 0.8 0.78 0.75 0.95 0.88 0.79 0.72 0.61 0.82 0.8 0.76 0.69 0.62 0.79 0.63 0.59 0.59 0.56
2.75
50 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.8 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.61 0.94 0.87 0.76 0.66 0.59
100 0.8 0.84 0.8 0.78 0.76 0.98 0.89 0.81 0.71 0.69 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.68 0.6 0.92 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.58
300 0.85 0.83 0.8 0.78 0.75 0.95 0.88 0.79 0.72 0.61 0.81 0.8 0.75 0.69 0.61 0.78 0.63 0.6 0.6 0.56
3
50 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.98 0.94 0.86 0.77 0.7 0.8 0.78 0.76 0.69 0.59 0.94 0.87 0.76 0.66 0.58
100 0.79 0.81 0.8 0.77 0.73 0.98 0.87 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.8 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.57 0.92 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.56
300 0.87 0.8 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.94 0.84 0.72 0.61 0.58 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.68 0.6 0.77 0.62 0.61 0.6 0.55
3.25
50 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.98 0.94 0.86 0.77 0.7 0.8 0.79 0.76 0.68 0.57 0.94 0.88 0.75 0.65 0.55
100 0.79 0.81 0.8 0.77 0.73 0.98 0.87 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.81 0.79 0.74 0.65 0.55 0.92 0.77 0.69 0.62 0.53
300 0.87 0.8 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.94 0.84 0.72 0.61 0.58 0.81 0.79 0.74 0.67 0.58 0.77 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.52
3.5
50 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.98 0.94 0.86 0.77 0.7 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.67 0.55 0.94 0.87 0.75 0.64 0.54
100 0.79 0.81 0.8 0.77 0.73 0.98 0.87 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.64 0.54 0.92 0.76 0.69 0.62 0.52
300 0.87 0.8 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.94 0.84 0.72 0.61 0.58 0.81 0.78 0.73 0.65 0.56 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.52
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Table 11. Values of ∆ (n,Φ ,γ ,K ) =
max
0.56E/I61
{ξ}− min
0.56E/I61
{ξ}
max
entire range of E
{ξ}− min
entire range of E
{ξ} for homogeneous in-arborescence networks. Entries
that are at least 2×0.16 are shown in boldface black. Entries that are at least 32 ×0.16 are shown in boldface gray.
←K→
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Coordinated
shock
|V |
=
50
Φ = 0.5 γ = 0.25 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83γ = 0.3 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Φ = 0.6 γ = 0.3 0.27 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52γ = 0.35 0.27 0.51 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Φ = 0.7 γ = 0.35 0.27 0.48 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65γ = 0.4 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Φ = 0.8 γ = 0.4 0.24 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47γ = 0.45 0.33 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Φ = 0.9 γ = 0.45 0.24 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56γ = 0.5 0.28 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
|V |
=
100
Φ = 0.5 γ = 0.25 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93γ = 0.3 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Φ = 0.6 γ = 0.3 0.39 0.27 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29γ = 0.35 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
Φ = 0.7 γ = 0.35 0.39 0.57 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69γ = 0.4 0.36 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Φ = 0.8 γ = 0.4 0.36 0.49 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53γ = 0.45 0.37 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Φ = 0.9 γ = 0.45 0.39 0.56 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67γ = 0.5 0.37 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
|V |
=
300
Φ = 0.5 γ = 0.25 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93γ = 0.3 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Φ = 0.6 γ = 0.3 0.39 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25γ = 0.35 0.31 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Φ = 0.7 γ = 0.35 0.40 0.53 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62γ = 0.4 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Φ = 0.8 γ = 0.4 0.38 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50γ = 0.45 0.39 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Φ = 0.9 γ = 0.45 0.40 0.53 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61γ = 0.5 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
Idiosyncratic
shock
|V |
=
50
Φ = 0.5 γ = 0.25 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.76 0.77 0.37 0.08 0.11 0.25γ = 0.3 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.99 0.76 0.33 0.07 0.23 0.29
Φ = 0.6 γ = 0.3 0.08 0.37 0.32 0.47 0.48 0.21 0.35 0.39 0.25γ = 0.35 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.30 0.38 0.27 0.24 0.13 0.16
Φ = 0.7 γ = 0.35 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.04 0.26 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.15γ = 0.4 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.25 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08
Φ = 0.8 γ = 0.4 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.10γ = 0.45 0.02 0.17 0.08 0.27 0.17 0.19 0.05 0.04 0.08
Φ = 0.9 γ = 0.45 0.09 0.07 0.20 0.21 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.17γ = 0.5 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.24 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.10
|V |
=
100
Φ = 0.5 γ = 0.25 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.67 0.37 0.16 0.03 0.16γ = 0.3 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.71 0.31 0.07 0.11 0.26
Φ = 0.6 γ = 0.3 0.04 0.15 0.3 0.44 0.03 0.08 0.22 0.16 0.06γ = 0.35 0.03 0.04 0.29 0.30 0.17 0.33 0.06 0.10 0.10
Φ = 0.7 γ = 0.35 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.23 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.06γ = 0.4 0.02 0.1 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.05
Φ = 0.8 γ = 0.4 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.08γ = 0.45 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.08
Φ = 0.9 γ = 0.45 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07γ = 0.5 0.05 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.04
|V |
=
300
Φ = 0.5 γ = 0.25 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.69 0.36 0.16 0.07 0.16γ = 0.3 1.00 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.69 0.36 0.12 0.06 0.23
Φ = 0.6 γ = 0.3 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.21 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.14γ = 0.35 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.04
Φ = 0.7 γ = 0.35 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.08γ = 0.4 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.05
Φ = 0.8 γ = 0.4 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.08γ = 0.45 0.04 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.05
Φ = 0.9 γ = 0.45 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07γ = 0.5 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.05
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Formal intuition
A formal intuition behind such a sharp decrease of ξ can be provided as follows.
LEMMA 7.6 (see Section F of the appendix for a proof) Fix γ , Φ , I , a homogeneous in-arborescence
network G and assume that γ ≈ Φ/2. Consider any node v ∈ V✖ with deg in(v) > 1, suppose that v fails
due to the initial shock. Let u be any node such that u is a “leaf node” (i.e., deg in(u) = 0), and (u,v)∈ E .
Then, as the total external asset E of the network is varied, there exists a threshold value Eτ(u) such that
• if E < Eτ(u) then u will become insolvent, but
• if E > Eτ(u) then u will not become insolvent at any time t > 1, and the shock will not propagate
any further through u.
The next lemma provides a lower bound, using the degree distributions of the Bara´basi-Albert
preferential-attachment model [8], on the expected value of the number of leaves in a random in-
arborescence network for which Lemma 7.6 can be applied.
LEMMA 7.7 (see Section G of the appendix for a proof) Consider a random in-arborescence G = (V,E)
generated by the Bara´basi-Albert preferential-attachment algorithm [8] as outlined in Section 6.1 and
let
V̂ =
{
u ∈V ∣∣(deg in(u) = 0) ∧ (∃v : ((deg in(v)> 1) ∧ ((u,v) ∈ E)))}
Then, E
[∣∣V̂ ∣∣]> n8 − 118 .
Let ξ (E ) be the value of ξ parameterized by E (keeping all other parameters unchanged), and let
Eτmin = min
{
Eτ(u)
∣∣deg in(u) = 0, (u,v) ∈ E and deg in(v)> 1}
Eτmax = max
{
Eτ(u)
∣∣deg in(u) = 0, (u,v) ∈ E and deg in(v)> 1}
It then follows that
E [ξ (Eτmin)]−E [ξ (Eτmax)]>
n
8 − 118
n
≈ 18
and ξ (E ) exhibits a sharp decrease around the range [Eτmin , Eτmax ]. In practice, the extent of this decrease
is expected to be much more than the pessimistic lower bound of 1/8, as our simulation results clearly
show.
8. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have initiated a methodology for systematic investigation of the global stabilities of
financial networks that arise in OTC derivatives market and elsewhere. Our results can be viewed
as a much needed beginning of a systematic investigation of these issues, with future research works
concentrating on further improving the network model, the stability measure and parameter choices.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 7.1
We will reuse the notations in Definition 6.1. Using Equation (5.1), for every edge (u,v)∈E , the amount
of shock received by node u at time t = 1 is as follows:
• If G is homogeneous then
E [∆ homo(u)] =
min
{
Φ
(
deg in(v)− degout(v)+ E
n
) − γ (deg in(v)+ E
n
)
, deg in(v)
}
deg in(v)
= min
{(
Φ− γ)+ En (Φ− γ) − Φ degout(v)deg in(v) , 1
}
• If G is (α,β )-heterogeneous, then σv = βα and, using linearity of expectation, we get
E [bv] = E
 ∑
(u,v)∈E˜
(
α
βI
α |E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)
= deg in(v)E
[(
β I|E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)]
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E [bv− ιv] = E
 ∑
(u,v)∈E˜
(
α
βI
α |E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)
− ∑
(v,u)∈E˜
(
α
βI
α |E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)
= ∑
(u,v)∈E˜
E
[(
β I|E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)]
− ∑
(v,u)∈E˜
E
[(
β I|E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)]
=
(
deg in(v)− degout(v))E[(β I|E˜| + (1−α)
(
1−β)I
|E|−α |E˜|
)]
E [∆ hetero(u)] = E
[
min{Φ (bv− ιv +σv E )− γ (bv +σv E ) , bv}
deg in(v)
]
= min
{
E
[
Φ (bv− ιv +σv E )− γ (bv +σv E )
deg in(v)
]
, E
[
bv
deg in(v)
]}
= min
{
Φ
deg in(v) E [bv− ιv] +
Φ σv E
deg in(v) −
γ
deg in(v) E [bv] −
γ σv E
deg in(v) ,
1
deg in(v) E [bv]
}
= min
{
Φ
deg in(v)
(
deg in(v)− degout(v))E[(β I|E˜| + (1−α)
(
1−β
)
I
|E|−α |E˜|
)]
+ Φ σv Edeg in(v)
− γdeg in(v) deg in(v)E
[(
β I|E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)]
− γ σv Edeg in(v) ,
E
[(
β I|E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)]}
= min
{
Φ
(
deg in(v)−degout(v)
)
−γ deg in(v)
deg in(v) E
[(
β I|E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)]
+
(
Φ−γ
)
σv E
deg in(v) ,
E
[(
β I|E˜| +
(
1−α) (1−β)I|E|−α |E˜|
)]}
> min
{
Φ
(
deg in(v)−degout(v)
)
−γ deg in(v)
deg in(v) β E
[
I
|E˜|
]
+
(
Φ−γ
)
σv E
deg in(v) , β E
[
I
|E˜ |
]}
> min
{(
Φ
(
deg in(v)−degout(v)
)
−γ deg in(v)
deg in(v)
) ( β
α
)
+
( β
α
) ((Φ−γ)E
deg in(v)
)
, βα
}
since E
[
I
|E˜ |
]
= E
[ |E|
|E˜|
]
= α
>
β
α
min
{(
Φ− γ)+ (Φ− γ)E −Φ degout(v)deg in(v) , 1
}
>
β
α
E [∆ homo(u)]
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B. Proof of Lemma 7.2
Using standard probabilistic calculations, we get
E
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣∣deg in(v)> 0]= n−1∑
k=1
1
k Pr
[
deg in(v) = k
]
=C
n−1
∑
k=1
k−4 ≈C ζ (4)≈ pi
2
15 degave
Var
[
deg in(v)
]
= E
[(
deg in(v)
)2]
−
(
E
[
deg in(v)
])2
=
n−1
∑
k=1
k2
(
Ck−3
)− (degave)2
=C
n−1
∑
k=1
1
k − (degave)
2 ≈ 6degave
pi2
lnn− (degave)2 ≈ 6degave
pi2
lnn
C. Proof of Lemma 7.3
Let D = ∑
v∈V˜
deg in(v)+ ∑
v∈V˜
degout(v). By linearity of expectation, we have
E [D ] = 2 ∑
v∈V˜
E
[
deg in(v)
]
= 2α ndegave
and similarly, since deg in(v) is independent of any other deg in(u) for u 6= v, we have
Var [D ] = 2 ∑
v∈V˜
Var
[
deg in(v)
]
≈ 12degave
pi2
α n lnn
Thus, via Chebyschev’s inequality [4, page 37], for any positive λ we have
Pr
[
|D − E [D ] |> λ
√
Var [D ]
]
6 1λ 2 ≡ Pr
[
|D − 2α ndegave |' λ
√
12degave
pi2
α n lnn
]
6 1λ 2
Setting λ =
√
pi2 lnn
12α gives Pr
[ |D − 2α ndegave |'√ndegave lnn]6 12α
pi2 lnn
and thus w.h.p. D ≈
2α ndegave. Since D2 6 | E˜ |6 D , it now follows that
α ndegave 6 E
[
| E˜ |
]
6 2α ndegave
w.h.p. α ndegave 6 | E˜ | 6 2α ndegave
Also, note that Pr
[
(u,v) ∈ E˜
]
= Pr
[
v ∈ V˜
]
= α . For notational convenience, let E˜1 be a random subset
of α|E˜| of edges from the edges in E˜ as used in Definition 6.1. This implies that
E
[
chetero1
]
= Pr
[
(u,v) ∈ E˜1
] ( β I
α | E˜ |
)
+
(
1−Pr
[
(u,v) ∈ E˜1
])
I −β I
|E|−α | E˜ |
= α Pr
[
(u,v) ∈ E˜
] ( β I
α | E˜ |
)
+
(
1−α Pr
[
(u,v) ∈ E˜
])
I −β I
|E|−α | E˜ |
= α2
( β I
α | E˜ |
)
+
(
1−α2) I −β I|E|−α | E˜ |
⇒ w.h.p. α2 β ndegave
2α ndegave
+
(
1−α2) (1−β )ndegave
ndegave−α ndegave
DASGUPTA AND KALIGOUNDER
6 E
[
chetero1
]
6 α2
β ndegave
α ndegave
+
(
1−α2) (1−β )ndegave
ndegave− 2α ndegave
≡ w.h.p. α β2 +(1+α) (1−β )6 E
[
chetero1
]
6 α β +
(
1−α2) (1−β )
1− 2α
≡ w.h.p. 1+α−β − α β
2
6 E
[
chetero1
]
6
1+α β −α2−β −α2 β
1− 2α
D. Proof of Lemma 7.4
E
[
1
deg in(v)
]
=
n−1
∑
k=1
1
k Pr
[
deg in(v) = k
]
=
n−1
∑
k=1
1
k e
−degave (degave)k
k! . It is easy to see that extending the finite
series to an infinite series does not change the asymptotic value of the series since
∞
∑
k=1
1
k e
−degave (degave)
k
k! −
n−1
∑
k=1
1
k e
−degave (degave)
k
k!
=
∞
∑
k=n
1
k e
−degave (degave)
k
k!
6 e
−degave
n ∑∞k=n
(degave)k
k!
6
(
e−degave
n
)(
(degave)n
n!
) (
max
06x6degave
{ex}
)
using the Lagrange remainder term
for the Maclaurin series expansion of edegave
=
(
e−degave
n
)(
(degave)n
n!
)
edegave
=
(degave)n
n(n!)
and lim
n→∞
(degave)n
n (n!) because degave is a constant independent of n. Thus, we can conclude that
∞
∑
k=1
1
k e
−degave (degave)k
k! ≈
n−1
∑
k=1
1
k e
−degave (degave)k
k! . It now follows that
∂
∂ dE
[
1
deg in(v)
∣∣degave = d]≈ ∂∂ d ∞∑k=1 1k e−d d
k
k!
= e−d
∞
∑
k=1
dk−1
k! =
e−d
d
∞
∑
k=1
dk
k! =
e−d
d
(
ed − 1
)
=
1− e−d
d
This proves one of the claims in the lemma. To prove the other claim, using a well-known approximation
on the first inverse moment of Poisson’s distribution [40, page 173] we have∣∣∣∣∣ ∞∑k=1 1k e−degave (degave)
k
k! −
⌊3degave+10⌋
∑
k=1
1
k e
−degave (degave)
k
k!
∣∣∣∣∣< 10−10
and therefore we obtain∣∣∣∣∣ n−1∑k=1 1k e−degave (degave)
k
k! −
⌊3degave+10⌋
∑
k=1
1
k e
−degave (degave)
k
k!
∣∣∣∣∣/ 10−10
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E. Proof of Lemma 7.5
Let D = ∑v∈V˜ deg in(v) +∑v∈V˜ degout(v). We can reuse the proof of Lemma 7.3 provided we show
that E [D ] = 2α ndegave and w.h.p. D ≈ 2α ndegave. By linearity of expectation, we have E [D ] =
2 ∑v∈V˜ E
[
deg in(v)
]
= 2α ndegave, and similarly Var [D ] = 2 ∑v∈V˜ Var
[
deg in(v)
]
= 2α n
(
1− degave
n−1
)
degave≈
2α ndegave. Thus, via Chebyschev’s inequality, for any positive λ we have
Pr
[
|D − E [D ] |> λ
√
Var [D ]
]
6
1
λ 2 ≡ Pr
[
|D − 2α ndegave |' λ
√
2α ndegave
]
6
1
λ 2
Setting λ =
√
lnn
2α gives
Pr
[
|D − 2α ndegave |'
√
ndegave lnn
]
6
2α
lnn
and thus w.h.p. D ≈ 2α ndegave.
F. Proof of Lemma 7.6
The amount of shock µ transmitted from v to u is given by
µ = min
{
(Φ− γ)
(
1+ E
ndeg in(v)
)
+Φ deg
out(v)
deg in(v) , 1
}
Since G is an in-arborescence, degout(v) 6 1. First, consider the case of degout(v) = 0. In this case,
µ = min
{
(Φ − γ)
(
1+ E
ndeg in(v)
)
, 1
}
and thus we have
cu(1) = cu(0)− µ = γ E
n
− min
{
(Φ− γ)
(
1+
E
ndeg in(v)
)
, 1
}
Assuming γ ≈ Φ/2, we have
cu(1)≈ γ E
n
+ deg in(u) − min
{
γ
(
1+ E
ndeg in(v)
)
, 1
}
= min
{
γ
(
E
n
− 1− E
ndeg in(v)
)
, γ E
n
− 1
}
There are two cases to consider:
• If γ
(
E
n
− 1− E
ndeg in(v)
)
> γ E
n
− 1 then
cu(1)≈ γ
(
E
n
− 1− E
ndeg in(v)
)
= γ
(
E
n
(
1− 1deg in(v)
)
− 1
)
Thus, if E > Eτ1(u) =
n
1− 1
deg in(v)
then cu(1) would be strictly positive, the node u will not become
insolvent at time t = 1, but if E < Eτ1(u) then cu(1) would be strictly negative and u would fail.
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• Otherwise, cu(1) ≈ γ En − 1. Thus, if E > Eτ2(u) = nE then cu(1) would be strictly positive, the
node u will not become insolvent at time t = 1, but if E < Eτ1(u) then cu(1) would be strictly
negative and u would fail.
A similar analysis may be carried out if degout(v) = 1 leading to slightly two different threshold values,
say Eτ3(u) and Eτ4(u). Since degout(u) = 1, if u does not become insolvent at time t = 1 then it does not
become insolvent for any t > 1 as well.
G. Proof of Lemma 7.7
Let r be the root node of G. Note that, for any node u ∈ V \ {r}, degout(u) = 1. Thus, using the
results in [8], it follows that for any node u ∈ V \ {r}, Pr[deg in(u) = k− 1] ∝ 1/k3 and in particular
Pr
[
deg in(u) = 1
]
6 1/4. For j = 0,2, . . . ,n, let n j be the number of nodes u of G with deg in(u) = j.
Thus, n =
n
∑
j=0
n j, |E|= n− 1 =
n
∑
j=1
j n j, and
∑
u∈V\{r}
Pr
[
deg in(u) = 1
]
6 E [n1]6 1+ ∑
u∈V\{r}
Pr
[
deg in(u) = 1
]
≡ n− 1
4
6 E [n1]6 1+
n− 1
4
≡ E [n1] = n− 14 + t for some t ∈ [0,1]
Letting n>1 =
n
∑
j=2
n j, we have
E [n0 + n>1] = n−E [n1] = 3n+ 14 − t
E
[
n
∑
j=1
j n j
]
= n− 1 ≡ E [n1]+E
[
n
∑
j=2
j n j
]
= n− 1
≡ E [n1]+ 2E [n>1]6 n− 1 ⇒ E [n>1]6
n− 1− 3n+14 + t
2
=
n
8 +
4t− 5
8
E [n0] = n−E [n1]−E [n>1]> n−
(
n− 1
4
+ t
)
−
(
n
8 +
4t− 5
8
)
=
n
8 +
7
8 −
3 t
2
and hence we can bound E
[∣∣V̂ ∣∣] as
E
[∣∣V̂ ∣∣]= E [n0]−E[∣∣∣{u ∈V ∣∣(deg in(u) = 0) ∧ (∃v : ((deg in(v) = 1) ∧ ((u,v) ∈ E)))}∣∣∣]
> E [n0]−E [n1]>
(
n
8 +
7
8 −
3 t
2
)
−
(
n− 1
4 + t
)
=
n
8 +
9
8 −
5 t
2 >
n
8 −
11
8
STABILITY OF FINANCIAL NETWORKS
Supplementary documents follow
Supplementary Table S1—Table S9
Supplementary color figures FIG. S1—FIG. S11
DASGUPTA AND KALIGOUNDER
Table S1. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under idiosyncratic shocks. The percentages
shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
idiosyncratic shock
Φ = 0.5,γ = 0.45 Φ = 0.5,γ = 0.40
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |= 50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 76% 78% 82% 26% 58% 75%
ER, average degree 3 99% 100% 100% 43% 84% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 42% 100% 100% 23% 70% 88%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 2% 15% 0% 1% 10%
ER, average degree 3 0% 2% 16% 0% 1% 8%
ER, average degree 6 7% 10% 21% 2% 7% 14%
SF, average degree 3 0% 6% 22% 0% 2% 14%
SF, average degree 6 8% 19% 34% 4% 12% 21%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 2% 12% 0% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 7% 14% 22% 4% 9% 18%
ER, average degree 6 8% 18% 30% 6% 10% 20%
SF, average degree 3 0% 9% 19% 0% 3% 17%
SF, average degree 6 8% 12% 24% 4% 7% 18%
|V |= 100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 76% 78% 81% 32% 62% 81%
ER, average degree 3 66% 100% 100% 26% 74% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 29% 72% 100% 19% 53% 88%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 88% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 1% 12% 0% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 0% 0% 15% 0% 1% 10%
ER, average degree 6 6% 7% 16% 6% 6% 10%
SF, average degree 3 0% 6% 23% 0% 0% 16%
SF, average degree 6 8% 16% 30% 6% 12% 19%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 1% 11% 0% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 6% 10% 18% 0% 7% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 12% 22% 6% 8% 17%
SF, average degree 3 0% 2% 18% 0% 0% 16%
SF, average degree 6 5% 9% 18% 2% 6% 16%
|V |= 300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 76% 78% 81% 36% 67% 81%
ER, average degree 3 76% 100% 100% 22% 73% 93%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 26% 52% 100% 20% 42% 88%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 87% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 1% 12% 0% 1% 12%
ER, average degree 3 0% 2% 16% 0% 0% 5%
ER, average degree 6 0% 6% 12% 0% 2% 6%
SF, average degree 3 0% 9% 24% 0% 1% 16%
SF, average degree 6 7% 16% 28% 6% 9% 19%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 1% 11% 0% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 6% 8% 16% 0% 2% 16%
ER, average degree 6 6% 8% 17% 6% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 16% 0% 0% 16%
SF, average degree 6 2% 6% 16% 2% 5% 16%
STABILITY OF FINANCIAL NETWORKS
Table S2. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages
shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
coordinated shock
Φ = 0.6,γ = 0.55 Φ = 0.6,γ = 0.50
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |= 50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 2% 69% 93%
ER, average degree 3 97% 100% 100% 64% 95% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 56% 96% 100% 44% 87% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 1%
ER, average degree 6 9% 11% 14% 5% 7% 7%
SF, average degree 3 5% 9% 19% 0% 3% 8%
SF, average degree 6 22% 28% 41% 10% 15% 17%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 5% 7% 20% 3% 7% 16%
ER, average degree 6 11% 14% 26% 7% 7% 19%
SF, average degree 3 2% 8% 23% 1% 3% 18%
SF, average degree 6 9% 15% 26% 7% 8% 18%
|V |= 100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 23% 84% 93%
ER, average degree 3 85% 100% 100% 47% 86% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 37% 75% 100% 35% 71% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 96% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 3%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 9% 7% 7% 7%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 9% 0% 0% 5%
SF, average degree 6 10% 15% 21% 7% 7% 11%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 0% 7% 17% 0% 5% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 19% 7% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 1% 3% 15% 0% 1% 13%
SF, average degree 6 7% 9% 18% 7% 7% 17%
|V |= 300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 79% 93% 93%
ER, average degree 3 93% 100% 100% 48% 85% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 28% 56% 97% 28% 56% 97%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 93% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 3%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 7% 3% 7% 7%
SF, average degree 3 0% 0% 11% 0% 0% 3%
SF, average degree 6 7% 7% 18% 7% 7% 7%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 1% 7% 17% 1% 5% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 16% 7% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 13% 0% 0% 13%
SF, average degree 6 7% 7% 16% 7% 7% 16%
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Table S3. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages
shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
coordinated shock
Φ = 0.7,γ = 0.65 Φ = 0.7,γ = 0.60
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |= 50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 35% 88% 93%
ER, average degree 3 97% 100% 100% 81% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 56% 96% 100% 52% 96% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 1%
ER, average degree 6 10% 13% 16% 7% 7% 9%
SF, average degree 3 7% 12% 25% 1% 4% 9%
SF, average degree 6 26% 32% 49% 14% 15% 21%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 5% 8% 21% 3% 7% 17%
ER, average degree 6 13% 18% 30% 7% 7% 20%
SF, average degree 3 3% 9% 25% 1% 3% 19%
SF, average degree 6 9% 16% 28% 8% 9% 19%
|V |= 100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 31% 93% 93%
ER, average degree 3 85% 100% 100% 62% 97% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 37% 75% 100% 37% 75% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 5%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 9% 7% 7% 7%
SF, average degree 3 0% 2% 15% 0% 0% 5%
SF, average degree 6 11% 15% 27% 7% 7% 11%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 0% 7% 18% 0% 7% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 19% 7% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 1% 4% 17% 0% 2% 13%
SF, average degree 6 8% 10% 19% 7% 8% 17%
|V |= 300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 56% 93% 93%
ER, average degree 3 93% 100% 100% 65% 97% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 28% 56% 97% 28% 56% 97%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 4%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 7% 6% 7% 7%
SF, average degree 3 0% 0% 15% 0% 0% 3%
SF, average degree 6 7% 7% 21% 7% 7% 7%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 1% 7% 17% 0% 7% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 16% 7% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 14% 0% 0% 13%
SF, average degree 6 7% 8% 16% 7% 7% 16%
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Table S4. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages
shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
coordinated shock
Φ = 0.8,γ = 0.75 Φ = 0.8,γ = 0.70
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |= 50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 93% 0% 0% 93%
ER, average degree 3 97% 100% 100% 89% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 56% 96% 100% 54% 96% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 7% 7% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 6% 0% 0% 1%
ER, average degree 6 12% 15% 19% 7% 7% 9%
SF, average degree 3 9% 15% 32% 1% 5% 11%
SF, average degree 6 27% 37% 60% 14% 19% 21%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 5% 11% 22% 4% 7% 17%
ER, average degree 6 14% 19% 30% 7% 11% 21%
SF, average degree 3 3% 11% 27% 1% 4% 19%
SF, average degree 6 11% 19% 31% 8% 9% 21%
|V |= 100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 51% 93% 93%
ER, average degree 3 85% 100% 100% 71% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 37% 75% 100% 37% 75% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 5%
ER, average degree 6 7% 9% 10% 7% 7% 7%
SF, average degree 3 0% 3% 20% 0% 0% 6%
SF, average degree 6 11% 19% 33% 7% 11% 11%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 0% 7% 19% 0% 7% 17%
ER, average degree 6 7% 8% 21% 7% 7% 17%
SF, average degree 3 1% 5% 18% 0% 2% 14%
SF, average degree 6 8% 10% 23% 7% 8% 17%
|V |= 300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 76% 93% 93%
ER, average degree 3 93% 100% 100% 76% 99% 100%
ER, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 28% 56% 97% 28% 56% 97%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 99% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 7% 0% 1% 5%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 16% 0% 0% 6%
SF, average degree 6 7% 11% 22% 7% 7% 8%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 1% 7% 17% 1% 7% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 16% 7% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 14% 0% 1% 13%
SF, average degree 6 7% 8% 17% 7% 7% 16%
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Table S5. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages
shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
coordinated shock
Φ = 0.9,γ = 0.85 Φ = 0.9,γ = 0.80
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |= 50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 81% 93% 93%
ER, average degree 3 98% 100% 100% 95% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 56% 96% 100% 56% 96% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 7% 7% 7% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 1%
ER, average degree 6 13% 18% 22% 7% 9% 10%
SF, average degree 3 11% 17% 37% 3% 5% 13%
SF, average degree 6 31% 41% 66% 18% 19% 25%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 15% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 5% 11% 25% 5% 7% 19%
ER, average degree 6 14% 19% 34% 7% 12% 23%
SF, average degree 3 4% 12% 28% 2% 6% 21%
SF, average degree 6 17% 21% 33% 8% 11% 23%
|V |= 100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 75% 93% 93%
ER, average degree 3 85% 100% 100% 78% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 37% 75% 100% 37% 75% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 6%
ER, average degree 6 7% 9% 10% 7% 7% 7%
SF, average degree 3 1% 4% 25% 0% 1% 7%
SF, average degree 6 14% 22% 41% 7% 11% 15%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 0% 7% 21% 0% 7% 17%
ER, average degree 6 7% 8% 23% 7% 7% 17%
SF, average degree 3 1% 5% 19% 1% 3% 15%
SF, average degree 6 9% 11% 23% 7% 9% 17%
|V |= 300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93%
ER, average degree 3 0% 0% 100% 85% 99% 100%
ER, average degree 6 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 3 28% 56% 97% 28% 56% 97%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 7% 0% 1% 6%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 17% 0% 0% 10%
SF, average degree 6 7% 11% 24% 7% 7% 10%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 1% 7% 17% 1% 7% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 17% 7% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 14% 0% 1% 13%
SF, average degree 6 7% 8% 17% 7% 7% 16%
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Table S6. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages
shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
idiosyncratic shock
Φ = 0.6,γ = 0.55 Φ = 0.6,γ = 0.50
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |= 50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 95% 53% 87% 95%
ER, average degree 3 100% 100% 100% 62% 95% 100%
ER, average degree 6 57% 58% 60% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 54% 100% 100% 45% 90% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 2% 4% 16% 1% 3% 11%
ER, average degree 3 0% 1% 14% 0% 0% 5%
ER, average degree 6 8% 11% 23% 5% 7% 12%
SF, average degree 3 0% 7% 24% 0% 2% 11%
SF, average degree 6 9% 21% 39% 7% 15% 25%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 3% 13% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 7% 14% 25% 5% 10% 19%
ER, average degree 6 11% 21% 34% 7% 11% 23%
SF, average degree 3 1% 11% 21% 0% 9% 18%
SF, average degree 6 10% 15% 27% 7% 9% 19%
|V |= 100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 94% 95% 69% 92% 95%
ER, average degree 3 77% 100% 100% 45% 87% 100%
ER, average degree 6 57% 57% 57% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 36% 81% 100% 34% 75% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 95% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 2% 13% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 1% 2% 17% 0% 1% 13%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 18% 7% 7% 15%
SF, average degree 3 0% 9% 25% 0% 3% 17%
SF, average degree 6 11% 19% 32% 7% 12% 22%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 5% 9% 19% 1% 8% 17%
ER, average degree 6 8% 13% 23% 7% 9% 19%
SF, average degree 3 0% 3% 19% 0% 1% 17%
SF, average degree 6 7% 9% 20% 7% 8% 17%
|V |= 300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 95% 93% 95% 96%
ER, average degree 3 96% 100% 100% 48% 89% 100%
ER, average degree 6 57% 57% 57% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 34% 70% 100% 31% 67% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 93% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 1% 12% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 0% 4% 16% 0% 1% 10%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 16% 5% 7% 12%
SF, average degree 3 0% 8% 25% 0% 3% 19%
SF, average degree 6 9% 17% 29% 7% 11% 21%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9%
ER, average degree 3 7% 8% 17% 3% 7% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 9% 18% 7% 7% 17%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 17% 0% 0% 16%
SF, average degree 6 7% 8% 17% 7% 7% 16%
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Table S7. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages
shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
idiosyncratic shock
Φ = 0.7,γ = 0.65 Φ = 0.7,γ = 0.60
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |= 50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 96% 73% 94% 95%
ER, average degree 3 100% 100% 100% 81% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 57% 59% 60% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 55% 100% 100% 55% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 3% 7% 17% 1% 2% 12%
ER, average degree 3 1% 5% 21% 0% 3% 13%
ER, average degree 6 10% 18% 28% 7% 9% 19%
SF, average degree 3 7% 9% 26% 0% 3% 19%
SF, average degree 6 13% 24% 41% 9% 16% 27%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 3% 14% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 7% 15% 27% 7% 10% 20%
ER, average degree 6 13% 23% 35% 7% 13% 25%
SF, average degree 3 1% 11% 23% 0% 6% 19%
SF, average degree 6 11% 17% 29% 7% 9% 20%
|V |= 100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 95% 79% 95% 95%
ER, average degree 3 77% 100% 100% 57% 97% 100%
ER, average degree 6 57% 57% 57% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 37% 78% 100% 35% 76% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 3% 13% 1% 1% 12%
ER, average degree 3 0% 4% 17% 0% 1% 14%
ER, average degree 6 7% 9% 19% 7% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 10% 25% 0% 3% 19%
SF, average degree 6 9% 18% 33% 8% 15% 25%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 1% 11% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 6% 11% 21% 3% 9% 17%
ER, average degree 6 7% 15% 25% 7% 9% 19%
SF, average degree 3 0% 3% 19% 0% 1% 17%
SF, average degree 6 7% 10% 21% 7% 8% 17%
|V |= 300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 95% 85% 95% 95%
ER, average degree 3 96% 100% 100% 67% 98% 100%
ER, average degree 6 57% 57% 57% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 33% 71% 100% 33% 69% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 99% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 1% 12% 1% 1% 12%
ER, average degree 3 1% 5% 16% 0% 2% 13%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 16% 6% 7% 15%
SF, average degree 3 0% 9% 25% 0% 3% 19%
SF, average degree 6 7% 17% 31% 7% 13% 21%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 1% 11% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 7% 8% 17% 3% 7% 17%
ER, average degree 6 7% 9% 19% 7% 8% 17%
SF, average degree 3 0% 3% 17% 0% 1% 16%
SF, average degree 6 7% 8% 17% 7% 7% 16%
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Table S8. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages
shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
idiosyncratic shock
Φ = 0.8,γ = 0.75 Φ = 0.8,γ = 0.70
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |= 50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 95% 83% 94% 95%
ER, average degree 3 100% 100% 100% 89% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 57% 60% 63% 57% 57% 58%
SF, average degree 3 55% 100% 100% 52% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 4% 9% 21% 1% 2% 12%
ER, average degree 3 0% 7% 21% 0% 1% 15%
ER, average degree 6 10% 21% 31% 7% 9% 17%
SF, average degree 3 1% 11% 27% 0% 5% 20%
SF, average degree 6 9% 23% 43% 9% 17% 31%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 2% 5% 15% 1% 1% 12%
ER, average degree 3 8% 18% 29% 7% 11% 21%
ER, average degree 6 15% 25% 38% 7% 15% 27%
SF, average degree 3 1% 12% 23% 0% 7% 19%
SF, average degree 6 12% 21% 33% 7% 10% 22%
|V |= 100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 95% 84% 94% 95%
ER, average degree 3 78% 100% 100% 68% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 57% 57% 59% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 37% 79% 100% 35% 81% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 3% 13% 1% 1% 13%
ER, average degree 3 0% 4% 17% 0% 3% 15%
ER, average degree 6 7% 9% 21% 7% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 9% 25% 0% 4% 19%
SF, average degree 6 10% 19% 35% 7% 17% 25%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 2% 13% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 5% 12% 21% 5% 9% 19%
ER, average degree 6 9% 16% 28% 7% 11% 20%
SF, average degree 3 0% 4% 19% 0% 1% 17%
SF, average degree 6 8% 11% 23% 7% 8% 17%
|V |= 300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 96% 92% 95% 95%
ER, average degree 3 96% 100% 100% 73% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 57% 57% 57% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 33% 67% 100% 31% 69% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 1% 12% 1% 1% 12%
ER, average degree 3 1% 5% 16% 1% 3% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 7% 17% 7% 7% 15%
SF, average degree 3 0% 9% 25% 0% 7% 22%
SF, average degree 6 9% 17% 31% 7% 13% 25%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 1% 11% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 7% 8% 18% 6% 7% 17%
ER, average degree 6 7% 9% 20% 7% 8% 17%
SF, average degree 3 0% 2% 17% 0% 1% 17%
SF, average degree 6 7% 8% 17% 7% 7% 17%
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Table S9. Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages
shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
idiosyncratic shock
Φ = 0.9,γ = 0.85 Φ = 0.9,γ = 0.80
ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2
|V |= 50
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 95% 93% 94% 95%
ER, average degree 3 100% 100% 100% 96% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 5% 5% 8% 57% 57% 59%
SF, average degree 3 55% 100% 100% 53% 100% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 9% 11% 21% 1% 3% 14%
ER, average degree 3 1% 9% 23% 0% 2% 14%
ER, average degree 6 11% 21% 31% 7% 10% 22%
SF, average degree 3 1% 11% 27% 0% 7% 20%
SF, average degree 6 12% 23% 44% 9% 20% 35%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 2% 4% 15% 1% 2% 12%
ER, average degree 3 8% 17% 31% 7% 12% 22%
ER, average degree 6 17% 25% 39% 9% 17% 29%
SF, average degree 3 1% 12% 25% 0% 8% 19%
SF, average degree 6 17% 23% 35% 9% 13% 23%
|V |= 100
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 95% 92% 95% 95%
ER, average degree 3 77% 100% 100% 74% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 3% 3% 5% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 34% 81% 100% 37% 81% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 3% 14% 1% 1% 12%
ER, average degree 3 0% 6% 19% 0% 1% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 13% 22% 7% 7% 17%
SF, average degree 3 0% 9% 25% 0% 6% 19%
SF, average degree 6 11% 21% 37% 7% 17% 29%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 2% 13% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 6% 13% 23% 5% 9% 19%
ER, average degree 6 9% 19% 31% 7% 11% 21%
SF, average degree 3 0% 5% 21% 0% 2% 17%
SF, average degree 6 9% 14% 25% 7% 8% 18%
|V |= 300
homogeneous
in-arborescence 94% 95% 95% 94% 95% 95%
ER, average degree 3 0% 0% 100% 85% 100% 100%
ER, average degree 6 3% 3% 3% 57% 57% 57%
SF, average degree 3 30% 69% 100% 31% 69% 100%
SF, average degree 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(0.1,0.95)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 1% 12% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 0% 5% 17% 0% 3% 16%
ER, average degree 6 7% 8% 17% 7% 7% 16%
SF, average degree 3 0% 9% 25% 0% 7% 22%
SF, average degree 6 10% 17% 33% 6% 15% 25%
(0.2,0.6)-heterogeneous
in-arborescence 1% 1% 11% 1% 1% 11%
ER, average degree 3 7% 9% 18% 6% 7% 17%
ER, average degree 6 7% 10% 21% 7% 9% 17%
SF, average degree 3 0% 1% 17% 0% 1% 17%
SF, average degree 6 7% 9% 17% 7% 7% 16%
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FIG. S1. Effect of variations of equity to asset ratio (with respect to shock) on the vulnerability index ξ for homogeneous networks.
Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S2. Effect of variations of equity to asset ratio (with respect to shock) on the vulnerability index ξ for (α ,β)-heterogeneous
networks. Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S3. Effect of variations of equity to asset ratio (with respect to shock) on the vulnerability index ξ for (α ,β)-heterogeneous
networks. Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S4. Effect of variations of the total external to internal asset ratio E/I on the vulnerability index ξ for homogeneous networks.
Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S5. Effect of variations of the total external to internal asset ratio E/I on the vulnerability index ξ for (α ,β)-heterogeneous
networks. Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S6. Effect of variations of equity to asset ratio (with respect to shock) on the vulnerability index ξ for homogeneous networks.
Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S7. Effect of variations of equity to asset ratio (with respect to shock) on the vulnerability index ξ for (α ,β)-heterogeneous
networks. Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S8. Effect of variations of equity to asset ratio (with respect to shock) on the vulnerability index ξ for (α ,β)-heterogeneous
networks. Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S9. Effect of variations of the total external to internal asset ratio E/I on the vulnerability index ξ for homogeneous networks.
Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S10. Effect of variations of the total external to internal asset ratio E/I on the vulnerability index ξ for (α ,β)-heterogeneous
networks. Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
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FIG. S11. Effect of variations of the total external to internal asset ratio E
I
on the vulnerability index ξ for (α ,β)-heterogeneous
networks. Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
